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Mob Justice and ‘The Civilized Commodity’ 
Developing a theory around ‘the civilized commodity’ we examine agrarian crises and the 
resulting ‘mob violence’ affecting high-value global commodities, including the vanilla market 
boom of Madagascar. We illustrate how producers labour under fraught conditions of violence, 
uncertainty, and contradictory claims of moral economy and ‘street justice’. The underlying 
question - what counts as justice and to whom - highlights broader arguments regarding the 
‘moral hyper-proximity’ of producer-consumer relations, and the strategies of state and market 
actors to circulate ‘civilized’ visions for the systemic and future governance over commodity 
landscapes. Calls by state and market agencies for a return to ‘law and order,’ however, obscure 
the structural, political, and economic inequities faced by smallholders in their ‘everyday’ 
production of commodities under periodic crisis.
1. Introduction: Commodity Theft, Justice and ‘The Mob’    
It was July of 2017, and we were packed into a village home located in the heart of 
Madagascar’s northeast ‘vanilla triangle’ trying to get some idea of the effects of the price spike 
on local vanilla growers.1 Vanilla bean prices had reached upwards of $600 a kilogram, 
representing nearly a 16-fold price inc ease to rural vanilla producers since 2013. As may be 
expected in such a boom market, the first thing we noticed about the price spike was the new 
wealth it brought to the area, as everywhere we looked we saw recently purchased consumer 
goods, including off-mark Chinese motorbikes, flashy neon-colored sofas, tin roofing and solar 
panels.2 
However, alongside this newly found wealth came a wave of insecurity and anxiousness, 
as farmers spoke of sleepless nights in their vanilla fields attempting to ward off thieves who 
wanted to cash in on the high prices. In fact, security concerns overwhelmed our conversations. 
The head of one growers’ association, Joseph, stressed, ‘…that when there’s a lot of money in 
the area, there is theft’, and when a thief is caught, more times than not, farmers are compelled to 
‘…take matters into their own hands’.3  When asked why they do not just call the police 
(gendarmes), another grower, Henri, grumbled: ‘we do not trust the gendarmes…they are the 
ones who sell guns to the dahalo [local bandits]’. We then asked what they do if they caught a 
1 The ‘we’ here includes the first and fourth author, only. The northeast coastal towns of Sambava, 
Antalaha, Vohemar and Andapa (SAVA) are center of vanilla-production in Madagascar.
2 It is the country’s primary export crop with proceeds of up to $800 million. For more on the material 
effects on local consumption patterns of the vanilla price spike see Zhu 2018.
3 Anonymous interviews (July 16 2017).
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dahalo stealing their vanilla. Joseph replied with a straight but rather deadpan expression, ‘dead 
immediately’.
Although Joseph’s statement was particularly blunt, there is no shortage of such stories of 
‘extra-judicial’ killings and other acts of violence from smallholders across the SAVA region of 
Northeastern Madagascar. Since the price spike began in 2016, there have been reports of 
increased incidents of vindicte populaire (or fitsaram bahoaka in Malagasy), acts we refer to in 
this discussion as ‘street’ or ‘mob justice’ to denote the contextual realities of village streets, 
where violence motivated by vanilla theft is taking place sometimes by individuals, but also in 
groups. While vigilante justice is not a new phenomenon in rural Madagascar (e.g. Sharp 1990), 
with the current price spike, these events are now more frequent and violent.4  In 2017 alone, it 
was reported that over 100 people, both thieves and farmers, were killed in the vanilla producing 
region of Andapa, located in the western part of the vanilla triangle. 
While this uptick in violence is disturbing, it would be simplistic to chalk up such violent 
responses by smallholders as ‘irrational’ or ‘chaotic’ actions taken by a desperate and precarious 
peasant class. On the contrary, the almost mundane descriptions of reprisals to vanilla theft, and 
the lack of response by Malagasy state authorities, signals a desire to seek out alternative forms 
of justice in the wake of the price spike.  In the absence of state and market mechanisms of 
support, many farmers currently regard ‘taking matt rs into their own hands’ as the most 
effective avenue to safeguard their livelihoods. Farmers look towards street justice primarily as a 
means of protecting their crops, but also as a form of ‘symbolic resistance’ against the 
gendarmes who smallholders suspect of deputizing thieves to steal from farmers on behalf of 
state officials. These acts of vigilante justice by smallholders effectively challenge the state’s 
legitimacy over the use of force (Weber 2013; Mbembé 2003). 
In such ways, mob violence is situated as a question of agrarian moral economy within 
which, despite differences in gender, class, and ethnicity, ‘a broader solidarity emerges’ in 
response to structural injustices imposed by the state and market forces (Neumann 2002, 42; see 
also Edelman 2005; Wolford 2010). In Madagascar, the moral economic relationships of 
smallholder vanilla farmers are embedded within the neoliberal market reforms and deregulation 
of the vanilla market during the mid-1990s (McMichael 2009). While smallholders have been 
4 For example, in some areas of Madagascar, there is a tradition of mob violence for certain serious 
infractions, such as stealing bones from ancestral tombs. 
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3
dealing with price variations for nearly twenty-five years, the current price spike has precipitated 
a crisis for rural communities that has engendered particularly acute levels of violence and 
mistrust. Thus, smallholders who are facing the loss of their livelihoods recalibrate their moral 
sensibilities around violence within the context of ‘boom and bust’ dynamics. This recalibration 
is breaking down certain existing moral economic relationships within communities, including 
creating heightened suspicions between neighbors, and even between members of the same 
family. At the same time, the vanilla crisis is also reinforcing other collective relationships, as 
individual farmers work together to organize patrols and mobilize shared security measures, 
including mob violence events.
The moral economy of rural street justice also influences, and is influenced by, multiple 
intersecting relationships of power that extend beyond local levels of production, however. For 
example, acts of mob violence are becoming increasingly visible to those living outside of rural 
Madagascar, as accounts of ‘vanilla violence’ reach a global audience through high profile media 
outlets. These accounts are similar to international news stories that highlight the violence 
connected with other high value commodities, such as ‘blood diamonds’ (Le Billon 2000), cacao 
(Dhariwal 2012), and avocados (Brown 2013). Reading these depictions in the media, 
downstream market actors, such as multinational companies and commodity suppliers, become 
anxious that consumers will turn away from products that use ‘blood’ vanilla.5 
The circulation of these stories illustrate what we call a ‘moral hyper-proximity’ of global 
commodities – the changing dynamics of producer-consumer relations in an age of high-speed 
media, where information about commodity production travels faster and in a greater diversity of 
forms (c.f. Goodman et al. 2017; Anderson 2014; Goodman et al 2016). Moral hyper-proximity 
brings ideas of what producers and consumers each believe to be 'fair' dynamics of commodity 
production and trade relationships into more immediate contact through diverse social media 
platforms (Besky 2008; Moberg and Lyon 2010; West 2012). For example, many stories on mob 
violence in the vanilla market emphasize the preference for ‘law and order’ structures to prevail, 
linking this outcome with best serving farmers.6 The international attention surrounding 
Madagascar’s vanilla industry is forcing the Malagasy government to take action to reclaim 
5 For example, see: https://old.danwatch.dk/en/undersogelseskapitel/du-risikerer-at-koebe-stjaalen-
vanilje-i-supermarkedet/
6 This notion of justice commonly aligns with discussions of literature largely based on western traditions 
of moral individualism (c.f. Rawls, 2005).
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authority and moral legitimacy over law enforcement, including through the increased 
militarization of the spaces of commodity production. 
We elaborate on the concepts of moral economy and moral hyper-proximity in the 
context of street violence of the vanilla boom. We argue that power struggles over defining the 
just governance of commodity relationships emerge, in attempts to delineate how people 
involved in commodity production and trade ‘should’ behave (Cavanaugh 2018, 405; Goodman 
et al. 2017). To bridge these diverse concepts, we mobilize Norbert Elias’ (2000; vol. 1; 1969; 
vol 2 1982) classic work, The Civilizing Process, to illustrate the historical and political 
conditions through which societies are managed. Elias signals micro-level changes in human 
behavior alongside periods of economic transformation and specialization in the late 18th 
Century (Durkheim 1893), when labour shifts brought social classes (e.g., the ‘village’ cobbler 
and the Bourgeois merchant), normally kept apart, in more frequent contact. This new proximity 
altered how people acted and presumably instilled a ‘civilizing processes’ of learned behaviors 
from the courtly social classes ‘downward.’7 In his later work, Elias (1982) thought of the 
civilizing process as essential to building the nation-state, with newly formed governments 
reinforcing ‘appropriate behaviors’ to bolster state legitimacy, enforce tax collection, and most 
noteworthy, to maintain a monopoly on violence.
Working from Elias, we explore ‘the civilized commodity,’ or the systemic governance 
over life under the fraught moral conditions of increasingly violent commodity circulation (Le 
Billon 2005). Placing the civilized commodity in conversation with street justice, moral economy 
and moral hyper-proximity highlights connections between liberalized boom/bust markets and 
the structural political economic inequities of ‘everyday’ production under periodic crisis. To 
many, commodity violence and street justice contrasts with the ‘civilized’ versions of how 
commodity production should look – transparent, controlled by state and market forces, and 
connected to the delivery of economic and social benefits (West 2012). Thus, farmers in 
Madagascar taking matters into their own hands becomes for downstream market actors an 
unseemly and ‘un-civilized’ way to resolve disputes.8
7 These behaviours included the capacity of foresight, rationalization, self-restraint, and the internalization 
of negative emotions such as anxiety and disgust. The state reified these behaviours over time through 
social sanctions and other disciplining tools (Foucault 1998; Weber 1993).
8 Alongside Elias, our use of civilizing here is not meant to be teleological or progression towards a 
superior model of behaviour or values, rather to show a critique to such thinking in a period of sped up 
and deregulated trade.
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Below we first provide a brief overview of moral economic theory within the agrarian 
studies tradition. We bring this literature into conversation with work on street justice in urban 
settings and with other forms of commodity violence, and argue for the potential for further work 
examining the parallels of street violence between rural and urban settings. Drawing mainly from 
ethnographic work with Malagasy smallholder vanilla farmers, we provide a detailed account of 
the material relations, historical dynamics, and cultural meaning of vanilla production and trade 
in the region. We consider the commodity crisis from the smallholders’ perspective in 
comparison to other market actors, including middlemen collectors and larger exporters. We 
draw on over 288 socio-economic surveys with both male and female vanilla growers of 
different levels of income and 40 semi-structured interviews with collectors, exporters, 
government officials and industry experts.9 We discuss the heterogeneity of vanilla growers and 
their different perspectives of violence, and consider various media accounts describing 
Madagascar’s vanilla boom and street justice events. We demonstrate that in a period of sped up 
consumer producer relations, the state and market react to peasant violence with ‘civilized’ law 
and order style responses meant to discipline the behavior of farmers, landscapes, and 
commodities. Actions, we show, that are meant to demonstrate state legitimacy and to maintain 
the state monopoly of violence in rural landscapes.  
2. Moral Economy and the limits of the state
It has been over fifty years since EP Thompson’s adoption of the term ‘moral economy’ in his 
seminal essay (1971) ‘The moral economy of the English working crowds in the eighteenth-
century.’ In the essay, Thompson explores the ‘bread-wage nexus’ and the condition of the ‘rural 
underclasses’ who rioted against uneven taxation and unfair pricing of grain. These ‘bread riots’ 
represented for Thompson, ‘direct popular action, disciplined and with clear objectives’ against 
market injustices and not thoughtless ‘rebellions of the belly’ caused by angry ‘mobs’. 
Thomson’s view is that the riots were a function of a ‘moral economy’ among the peasant classes 
based on identifiable and agreed upon ‘…social norms and obligations, of the proper economic 
functions’ which were infringed upon within changing political economic conditions (1971, 79; 
9 This work was conducted over the 2016-17 vanilla campaign within the region of SAVA and in the UK 
and USA. The survey was administered by CURSA, a regional University based in Antalaha, 
Madagascar.
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6
see also Wolford and Keene 2015, 576). For Thompson, there was little doubt that the bread riots 
had popular support and were legitimized by an overwhelming belief that ‘in times of dearth, the 
regulation of prices ought to be enforced, and those responsible in doing so must be held 
accountable’ (1971, 113). 
Thompson’s treatise on moral economy laid the foundation for future scholars concerned 
with social movements of peasants, particularly in times of dearth and economic change. James 
Scott, for example, examined how peasants navigated a similar moral terrain of rights and 
expectations to that of Thompson. Rather than mob justice, Scott’s analysis displayed tensions 
between landlords and farmers which boiled over due to subtle pressure points, especially the 
unfair extraction of rent. As a result, peasants engaged in ‘small’ acts of ‘everyday resistance’ – 
from work slowdowns to petty theft − as a way to express their own brand of ‘economic justice’ 
(1976, 3).’ Similarly to Thompson, this peasant response was ‘…not just a problem of calories 
and income but [a] question of peasant conceptions of social justice, of rights and obligations, of 
reciprocity’ (Scott, 1976, vii). Scott’s work was instrumental in critical agrarian studies. 
According to Edelman, one of Scott’s transformative contributions was to bridge critical 
scholarship focused on states and structure with that of the peasant’s everyday social 
reproduction and labour allocation (2005, 334). As Edelman explains:
Scott maintains that village level systems of reciprocity produce, over long historical 
time, widely held moral expectations.10 Market forces (sometimes in combination with 
environmental ones) pose challenges to these expectations and may, when thresholds 
of what is culturally acceptable are crossed, produce rebellion and collective 
resistance.
To varying degrees each of these contributions described peasant conceptions of local struggles 
within a changing political economy and how peasant navigate changing ethical and moral issues 
of reciprocity, values and justice within a shifting ‘subsistence ethic’ (Scott, 1976 see also 
Chayanov 1966). This subsistence ethic went beyond the quotidian requirements of meeting 
‘brute physiological needs’ to also encompass the subjective experiences accumulated in periods 
of political economic crisis (1976, 17). 
10 Others such as Eric Wolf, Benjamin Moore and scholars in the French school of Agricultural Sciences, 
more generally used the concept of moral economy in calling out of ‘markets’ as spaces of political 
contestation and struggle.
Page 6 of 68
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjps  Email: JPS.Editorial@gmail.com





























































For Peer Review Only
7
Critical scholars have since applied the concept of moral economy to a variety of 
geographic spaces and across multiple scales, including landless farmers in Brazil (Wolford 
2010), shifting cultivators (Kull 2004) and agropastoralists (Gingembre 2015) in Madagascar, 
and Fair Trade markets South Africa (McEwan et al 2017). Many of these scholars diverge in 
their conceptual usage of moral economy, yet all in some way draw attention to what Neumann 
(2002, 37) remarks as the shifting ‘…norms, values, and expectations related to the livelihoods 
of subordinate classes during major economic transformations’ (see also: McCarthy 2002; Moore 
1998).
Moral economy and street violence
Less effective, however, has been the adoption of moral economy to understand its close 
association with diverse forms of ‘justice,’ in particular, the less understood concept of ‘street 
justice’ or vindicte populaire.  Our discussion aims to bridge these two bodies of literature, by 
placing street justice as enacted by smallholders into moral economic framings that foreground 
the intersections of liberalized markets and state vulnerability. It is within such a context that 
Malagasy farmers resort to street violence to protect their vanilla resources− an act we 
understand to be, in part, a particular form of commodity violence. This violence is not random, 
however, but is situated within broader moral economic relationships between farmers, states, 
and commodity markets. As violence escalates, certain aspects of these moral economic 
relationships begin to break-down, as distrust grows between and among farmers, Malagasy state 
officials, and market actors.
The escalating violence associated with the vanilla boom parallels similar forms of 
violence associated with high value commodities, especially within largely deregulated markets. 
For example, cacao production in Africa has long been associated with violence and the 
exploitation of children (Financial times 2018), including a wave of rural violence in 
Madagascar in 2012 during the global cacao boom when armed thieves stole cacao pods from 
smallholders (Dhariwal 2012). The diamond trade is notorious for its reliance on "conflict" 
diamonds obtained through systematic violence and outright conflict and is often cited as an 
example of ‘resource wars’ (Le Billon 2004, 1). The liberalization of access and control to 
valuable commodities, such as conflict minerals, oil, timber, and commodity crops many times 
exacerbates historical tensions of uneven development and marginalization, which may also lead 
Page 7 of 68
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjps  Email: JPS.Editorial@gmail.com





























































For Peer Review Only
8
to widespread violence, including organized armed conflicts (Watts and Peluso 2001). Other 
work on ‘neoliberal commodity economies’ points to the structural violence intrinsic to even 
outwardly nonviolent trade relationship, especially for the low-wage, comparatively 
disenfranchised individuals within international commodity relationships (Nevins and Peluso 
2008).
The ‘street justice’ killings of vanilla thieves in Madagascar are another form of 
commodity violence, which presents both similarities and differences to the above examples. In 
considering these forms of violence, we adopt the term ‘street justice’ for two main reasons. 
First, the use of the w rd ‘street’ helps navigate the naturalizing connotations of ‘mob mentality’ 
and its suggestion of irrational behaviors. Second, we aim to denote that village streets are 
subject to social forms of violence similar to that noted within urban contexts, especially in 
places subjected to periods of austerity and neglect (see Pavoni and Tulumello 2018).  For 
example, our study on the ‘mobilizing of violence’ in village streets somewhat follows 
Karandinos et al. (2014) and Anderson’s (1999) work on drug gangs in inner-city Philadelphia. 
In this work, street violence is not necessarily random or chaotic, but often directed by individual 
or groups following understood ‘codes of the street’ (Bourgois 2003). Karandinos et al. (2014, 1) 
describe such codes as ‘ethical norms and obligations which are recognized as legitimate’ 
reactions by locals as a way to navigate moral economic and social change and crisis. 
These reactions, however unseemly and ‘uncivilized’ to outsiders, are a way for localized 
justice to take place when the main arbitrator of justice, the state, is absent (Spierenburg 2009).  
The dynamics between weak states, changing neoliberal markets, and mob violence have been 
described in other regions as well (Abrahams 1998). For example, a wave of street justice 
violence and lynching in Bolivia was described as a mechanism for communities to ‘take law 
into their own hands’ in frustration with the lack of state response against rampant crime 
(Goldstein 2003). In this way, Goldstein argues, “vigilantism acts as a moral complaint against 
state inadequacy, challenging state legitimacy and redefining ideas about justice, citizenship, and 
law in the process (2003, 22).” Similarly Smith, writing of the vigilante justice group in Nigeria 
known as the Bakassi boys notes that this group killed suspected criminals in response to 
perceived failure of the state to safeguard citizen rights during a time of intensified market 
reforms and economic change (2004).  
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9
To bring together these frameworks – commodity violence, street justice, and moral 
economy - we turn to the empirical case of 'street justice' violence in Madagascar surrounding 
the vanilla boom, which illustrates how ideas of moral economy and street justice intersect in the 
context of commodity production and trade. We ask what the vanilla crisis can tell us about the 
intersections of moral economy and justice in the context of economic volatility and uncertainty, 
as Malagasy farmers increasingly take matters of justice ‘into their own hands.’
3.  Overview of vanilla cultivation and trade in Madagascar
The current dynamics of Madagascar’s 'street violence' are situated within broader economic, 
political, and environmental contexts of global commodity production and trade. In particular, 
we see the crisis tied directly to the deregulation of commodities markets in the 1990s. While 
mob justice is not necessarily new form of violence in Madagascar, this deregulation is a key 
point of departure for us to better understand the connections between the political and moral 
economy of street justice, global commodity circuits, and the historical roll-back of state power 
and legitimacy in rural Madagascar. 
Vanilla was thought to be introduced to Réunion, Mauritius, and then Madagascar in the 
early 1800s by the French who were looking to establish commercial plantations (Havkin-
Frenkel et al. 2010). Their initial attempts were stymied, however, due of the lack of a natural 
pollinator found in vanilla’s native regions of Mexico and wider regions of Central America. 
This all changed around the 1840s when a viable, but labour intensive, method of hand 
pollination was discovered.11 With this discovery, the French were essentially able to 
monopolize vanilla cultivation in Madagascar and the neighbouring territories. 
After Madagascar gained independence in 1960, the new socialist government instituted 
regulations on the vanilla trade, aimed at stabilizing prices and global supplies. Though 
providing some security for farmers during the ensuing decades, there also emerged entrenched 
alliances between political and economic interests, as the vanilla market became marked by 
corruption and opaque relationships of trade. Then, under pressure from international monetary 
agencies, Madagascar deregulated the vanilla trade in the 1990s, leading eventually to highly 
volatile market conditions marked by dramatic booms and prolonged bust periods (Laney and 
Turner 2015; Cadot et al. 2010). One of these price spikes occurred in the late 1990s and early 
11 In Mexico, the plant is pollinated by melipona bees and hummingbirds. 
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2000s, exasperated by a cyclone that destroyed much of Madagascar's vanilla harvest. This boom 
was followed by a rapid price crash, with prices falling to below $40/kg (see Figure 1 below).    
While many vanilla farmers elsewhere around the globe abandoned vanilla cultivation during the 
prolonged bust market, which stretched the decade between 2005 and 2015, many Malagasy 
farmers continued to cultivate vanilla, dependent on the crop and with few other options 
(Osterhoudt 2017). The current boom market, with vanilla prices nearing 600/kg, thus arrives 
after a decade-long period of hardship and struggle for rural households in vanilla producing 
regions of Madagascar.12
Figure 1: Average Price for Vanilla from 1971 to 2017 (adopted from Nielsen-Massy Vanillas)
Today, Madagascar continues to dominate production in the global vanilla market. Its branded 
variety ‘Bourbon,’ is the industry’s 'gold standard,' recognised for its unique and diverse flavour 
profile. It is Madagascar’s leading agricultural export, valued at approximately $800 million per 
year (OEC 2017). Madagascar’s hold over the market is no accident; the region maintains the 
ideal microclimate for vanilla cultivation, with suitable conditions of moisture and temperature. 
Yet, its global dominance owes more to the availability of cheap labour essential for commercial 
production. Vanilla is a labour-intensive crop and its cultivation includes the incredibly arduous 
tasks of hand pollination, a long growing period, and a four-month process of sun-curing beans. 
Many Malagasy households depend on vanilla income to meet basic needs, and thus invest the 
time and labour into cultivation and curing. Peasants’ dependence on the vanilla trade is no 
secret in the industry, as frequent discussions with exporters highlighted how in times of high or 
low prices, Malagasy farmers will continue to produce a vanilla harvest. As noted in a recent 
article in the Financial Times, ‘Not only is its climate perfect, but it is also one of the few places 
on earth poor enough to make the laborious process of hand pollination worthwhile’. 13
This farmer dependence on vanilla income is seen in the villages that are the site of our 
ethnographic research. These rural communities are situated within the main site for vanilla 
production in Madagascar, known as the ‘vanilla triangle’ of the SAVA district. The region 
comprises of around 800 villages scattered across over 23 thousand km with two main ethnic 
12 In addition to market deregulation and cyclone events, vanilla price spikes are also connected with the 
increase in illegal rosewood trafficking in the region (Zhu 2018).
13 Access at: https://www.ft.com/content/02042190-65bc-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56 (July 12, 2018).
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groups – the costal ‘Betsimisaraka’ and the ‘Tsimihety’ who occupy the higher altitudes making 
up the majority of the estimated 80-100 thousand vanilla farmers in the region.14 Even 
though this region remains one of Madagascar's wealthiest, and some farmers seem to be doing 
well financially under the current boom, the majority of peasant smallholders, who have access 
to less than 5 ha of land, still remain relatively poor and few economic choices, with many living 
off less than $2/day. Households in this area also struggled during the previous decade, with the 
prolonged bust of the vanilla market – a situation further exasperated by cyclone events, political 
uncertainty and government corruption that also beset the region during these years.
4. Theft and ‘Street Justice’ in the Vanilla Boom
In this context of prolonged economic hardship, intense labor requirements, and decades 
of collusion and corruption between certain state and market forces, the theft of vanilla hits 
smallholder farmers particularly hard. Exasperating the challenge of vanilla security is the 
materiality of the vanilla plant itself, which is a relatively easy crop to steal. It is an orchid grown 
in multistoried ‘garden’ systems called taniboly located in relatively far distance from village 
homes and under insecure customary tenure systems.  Beans develop on the vines between 
March and July, when they are vulnerable to theft, especially in May and June when the beans 
are relatively ripe but the official vanilla market in Madagascar has not yet opened. Thieves take 
advantage of this ‘lag time’ to steal green vanilla off the vine as the pods are easily swiped off 
without much effort and depending on moisture content relatively light to haul away. We found 
in our survey of 288 growers in the southern SAVA city of Antalaha, that over 58 percent 
(n=167) sell their vanilla early and still immature, and over 55 percent (n=159) said they do so 
that ‘no one will steal it’.15 
The distress of the theft and subsequent violence is having a severe effect on the social 
and economic relations between individual vanilla growers. Over 62 percent (n=111) responded 
that their life has become ‘much more difficult’ since the price spike began in 2014. Although the 
somewhat sizable minority of 36% (n= 105) did say that having ‘more money helped make life 
14 The French, the Chinese, Indo-Pakistanis and those of varied Arab descent arrived for the vanilla trade 
starting toward the end of the 19th century. Many Chinese have since intermarried with the Betsimisaraka 
and Tsimihety and occupy an outsized role in vanilla and other valuable commodities in the region (Zhu 
2016). 
15 ‘n’ refers to the total number of the 288 respondents who choose this answer.
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12
easier,’ the security situation was identified as the number one issue confronting all those 
surveyed, with 69 percent (n=199) saying that ‘security has gotten worse’ since the price spike. 
Moreover, 81 percent (n=232) responded that they have had their vanilla stolen or were affected 
by attempted theft. 
While vanilla theft is not a new phenomenon, the recent price spike has set off a 
particular harshness to the violence not as often seen in this region in the past, as farmers 
organize against potential vanilla bandits through measures that include direct and sometimes 
deadly force through 'street justice' events. In this region of Madagascar, a street justice event 
typically beings when a suspected thief is caught in someone’s vanilla fields, usually at night. 
Such thieves could be spotted by a farmer keeping watch over his or her field, by a community 
patrol, or by a guard hired to secure particular fields. Once a thief is apprehended, people sound 
the alarm through shouting and running through town, calling others to join the group. Many 
times, the thief is badly beaten or killed. Thieves may be local to the area or from outside the 
region. If the story of street violence ‘stays local’ – meaning it does not get reported outside the 
region - state officials usually do not punish those who participate.  However, as we see below, 
the state’s response changes if reports of street justice get out into international news, as 
Malagasy authorities need to maintain the appearance of legitimacy over market order. 
Many vanilla growers in Madagascar commented on the ‘cozy’ relationships between 
thieves and state authorities, including gendarmes and high court officials who either refused to 
halt, or were in some way complicit in, vanilla theft. This belief led to a ‘mistrust of the official 
justice system’ and the subsequent perceived need for farmers to ‘take matters into their own 
hands’. Only 21 percent (n= 61) of growers surveyed said that they felt thieves were ever 
‘caught’, (meaning brought to some sort of official justice) while 72 percent (n=206) said that 
‘nothing was ever done’ about reported vanilla thefts. Worse, some smallholders said that the 
state police forces were ‘colluding with local villagers and intermediaries, giving them the tools 
and protection to steal.’ As Aina, one older male vanilla grower described, there are many 
police, court and government officials who  have a ‘relationship’ to the thieves’16 and that, 
‘…when thieves are caught they are let go soon after.’ Aina went on to say:
16 Anon July 2017
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Let me explain what happens here. When we have caught the thieves, we hand them 
over to the authorities (Police National). However, the problem is that the thieves have 
paid the responsible officers and they are liberated afterwards…17
This collusion often continues after thieves are meant to stand trial:
They (the thieves) are rich but that does not restrain them from stealing. What is more, 
when we have filed the case at the court of justice, they withdraw the case since the 
thieves and their bosses have the financial means (to corrupt the judges) and the poor 
cannot do anything about it.18
This is not to say that theft of vanilla was not always an issue – as 67 percent (n=192) of 
respondents say that ‘theft has always been a problem’. However, it seems that the mechanisms 
that were once in place to protect vanilla growers and punish thieves have broken down at the 
same time as the stakes of vanilla thefts have been raised. With vanilla prices at record highs, 
more people are taking the risk to steal.  
The rise in thefts are disrupting local relationships, as many suspect that vanilla thieves 
are individuals from their own communities, or even their own family. As noted by Herimanoa, a 
male grower of organic certified vanilla, “they [thieves] are those living close, commission 
agents as well as authorities distribute money among young people. It is this act which obliges 
them to steal."19 It was explained to us, that ‘local recruits’ have the advantage of knowing your 
movements and whereabouts and therefore know when you are away. Sometimes the practice of 
recruiting from local villages pits family members against each other:  "In my opinion it is our 
children who dare to steal vanilla from their own fathers in our own fields," responded Hery, a 
moderately-wealthy smallholder.20  One common response we frequently heard was that local 
youth are more generally responsible for the act of stealing. Many said that they are actively 
recruited by both ‘commissionaires’ (middlemen) and financed by regional police. As expressed 
by Lalaina, a female grower living on the economic margins, 
Commissionaires incentivize local people to steal, and it is them who then buy the stolen 
vanilla. In fact, there was a thief amongst us in this village who knew all our secrets and 
we did not even know that he was a bandit, but he knew all our actions and movements"21
17 Anon July 2017
18 Anon Aug 2017
19 Anon Aug 2017
20 Anon July 2017
21 Anon Sept 2018
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The collusion of local youth with outside state officials against rural producers is 
disrupting the more usual moral economic relationships in agrarian Malagasy communities, 
whereby producer communities largely ‘stand together’ in the face of outside encroachment onto 
their land and resources (Gezon 1999, Osterhoudt 2016, Sodikoff 2012). The stakes of state 
corruption against farmers have also been raised; as the above quotes indicate, while state 
officials may not have given much protection to producers in the past, the current presumed 
complicity in vanilla theft crosses a moral and economic threshold for many farmers. 
In face of these shifting social relationships, vanilla farmers articulate the need for street 
justice to protect their livelihoods. By mobilizing acts of mob violence, farmers seek to secure 
their vanilla harvests in a way that protects them from state retribution, and which maintains 
market relationships within local and regional systems of trade. Street justice events also work 
within certain existing Malagasy social and moral economic systems, including framing 
confrontation through the collective rather than through the individual (Lambek and Solway 
2001; Sodikoff 2012) and through expression of rural solidarity against outside forces that 
encroach upon local land and resources (Jeroz 1999, Osterhoudt 2016). Street violence also 
prevents punishment by the state, by diffusing responsibility across a large, essentially 
anonymous group (Goldstein 2003; Smith 2004).
As described in classic work on moral economy as connected to group resistance and 
violence, people perpetuating violence are not irrational or intrinsically violent individuals, but 
are rather acting within social and moral boundaries to secure basic rights and livelihoods within 
more informal spheres of solidarity (Metz et al. 2010). They are thus essentially rational actors 
caught between powerful forces. Indeed, in Madagascar, farmers describe their position in these 
terms: people note that they do not enjoy having to resort to street justice tactics, but feel the 
economic stakes are too high to leave protection, or forms of retribution, to the mechanisms of an 
absent or corrupt state.
Media narratives of street justice 
 This unit of the collective as the locus of justice differs from western individualized 
notions of moral justice (Rawls 1971). One might expect that the local conceptions in rural 
Madagascar that farmers are performing regrettable, but understandable, acts of violence to 
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secure their rights to property and subsistence may differ from many of the media narratives of 
street justice in the vanilla market. In reality, the international media has been quite sympathetic 
to the plight of the Malagasy grower, positioning them as reacting to a market over which they 
have little control, and turning to street justice as their last resort. However, for the most part, 
media reports at the same time have presented ‘market actors’ as not being at all complicit in the 
current market crisis. Companies and civil society institutions are usually cast as either victims 
of the breakdown of local market supply (just cannot get enough vanilla to fill your artisanal ice 
cream orders) and/or as ‘saviors’ who can circumvent the corrupt state officials and greedy 
middlemen to ‘clean up’ the supply chain. 
Figure 2: Photo from lead story of vanilla from the Financial Times story ‘The real Price of the 
vanilla boom:’ https://www.ft.com/content/02042190-65bc-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56
Thus, while sympathetic to small farmers’ actions, these media accounts also assume that the 
best course forward is to eliminate violent forms of street justice, changing these practices 
primarily by improving the state control over institutionalized forms of security, poverty 
reduction, and legal accountability. As quoted in a leading UK newspaper:
As vanilla becomes worth more than silver, crime takes over the Madagascan trade. It's 
not the backbreaking work that makes growing vanilla near impossible, it's the security 
problem. As it grows in value, 'vanilla murders' are becoming more common, but despite 
the hike in price, thousands of farmers still remain poor.22
And in French newspaper:
Dozens of thieves have been apprehended in recent weeks; and such is the anger some 
have ended up being brutally murdered. "People trust only the people's justice…”23
Other media accounts of the violence are quite sympathetic to peasants’ plight, even normalizing 
such acts in these areas:
Farmers often awake to find their vines stripped bare, carried off in the night by gangs of 
thieves filling orders for buyers in the far-off capital of Antananarivo, who in turn supply 
the markets of western Europe, the US and Asia. In some parts of Sava, say non-
22 Accessed at: https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/food-and-drink/features/vanilla-farming-crime-
madagascar-trade-a8520396.html (02/12/2018)
23 Accessed at: https://www.france24.com/en/20180420-magagascar-vanilla-price-trade-crime-crop-
weather  (06/06//2018)
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governmental organisations working in the region, vigilante groups have sprung up to 
mete out summary justice to the vanilla snatchers.24
And another grower was depicted as describing moral equivalence in terms Western consumers 
could understand:
Soa [a vanilla grower] is plotting ever more dire punishments for anyone who does 
attempt to steal her current crop. At the moment vanilla thieves face 3-4 years in prison. 
As far as she is concerned, that’s not enough. She wants a life sentence. “You invest all 
your life in growing the vanilla. Stealing it is the same thing as killing someone.”25
Figure 3: Photo from Ft article of executives from Mars Inc. who have come to Madagascar 
on their first trip ever to plan development initiatives in order to stabilize farmers’ 
livelihoods and the market  
As the above headline illustrates, international companies are sometimes presented as ‘saviors’:
Emmanuel Faber, chairman and chief executive of Danone… recently travelled to 
Madagascar for the first time to find out why it is so expensive and what can be done to 
secure supplies and improve farmers’ lives.26
These headlines are effective in reaching the global market, and provoke potentially strong 
reactions from ethical consumers. In the case of vanilla, for example, consumers drawn to Fair 
Trade labels to help smallholder farmers may balk at their purchase if they learn that these same 
farmers are involved in brutal mob killings – even if these mob events are motivated by the 
desire of farmers to safeguard their agrarian livelihoods.27 If anything, the ‘globalizing’ effect of 
these news stories moving them from the rural streets of vanilla growing villages to the 
supermarket shelves forces the ’visible hand’ of the state to have to intervene on the ‘invisible 
24 Accessed at: https://www.ft.com/content/02042190-65bc-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56 (02/12/2018)
25Accessed at: http://time.com/5308143/vanilla-price-climate-change-madagascar/ (02/12/2018)
26 Accessed at: https://www.ft.com/content/02042190-65bc-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56 (02/12/2018)
27 It may be worth noting the role of the people identified with vanilla industry and market more 
generally. While smallholder vanilla farmers do not articulate resistance against market forces per se, the 
entrenched history of vanilla trade as imbricated in shady state practices becomes relevant. Many vanilla 
industry representatives remark that they must secure the loyalty of farmers in a supply-driven market, 
while also not falling out of favor with Malagasy government entities (who are empowered to revoke 
export licenses) or of international consumers, who may be upset by associations of violence with vanilla 
products. 
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hand’ of the violent vanilla market both to ensure stability and to regain legitimacy under the 
banner of ‘law and order’. 
State legitimacy and militarizing a broken market 
Circulating media headlines on vanilla violence do not only potentially influence 
consumers – they are also forcing representatives in Madagascar’s government into action.28 In 
response to international criticism, the state, with donor and market support, selected some of the 
hardest hit villages to ‘securitize vanilla’ through militarized-style defense trainings and the 
surveillance of smallh lders. A pilot project was conducted in six communes across each of the 
four districts of the region. The most well-known of these initiatives was the village of 
Ambodivohitra Kobahina (Andapa Region) - also dubbed the "Zero Theft" village. In this 
village, specific trainings were given to smallholders on topics including monitoring crops, 
securing paths leading to and from the fields, camouflaging, placing suspects under arrest, and 
transporting suspected thieves to police stations.29  Alongside new village security groups, 
known by villagers as “police fokonolo” (the villager’s police), the state installed barricades at 
village entrances and exits, as well as curfews.30 
The security associations established through these projects consisted of armed men from 
the village who patrolled the fields day and night (especially at night) during the dangerous 
months of February through August. While some members dutifully handed over the bandits 
they apprehended to the police, others decided to forego these official channels and pursue street 
justice measures. In these cases, people typically beat thieves, in order to deter others from 
stealing.31 This continuation of violence has not necessarily instilled confidence in the state to 
handle these matters, as stories of vicious acts in rural communities continued to circulate well 
after the scheme ended in 2016. Overall, the projects of militarization and ‘zero theft’ villages 
represent elaborate attempts by the state to restore a ‘civilized commodity production landscape’ 
most palatable to global consumers. 
28Beyond vanilla theft, the media was also now investigating rumors that ‘new vanilla buyers’ were 
laundering money from illegally trafficked rosewood. Accessed on: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/mar/31/madagascars-vanilla-wars-prized-spice-drives-
death-and-deforestation (02/12/2018).
29 Interview with SAVA/Development Coordination Unit (DCU) 11/20/2018.
30 Interview HoS/AK 02/12/2018 and DCU11/20/2018.
31 Interview Head of Security in Ambodivohitra Kobahina (HoS/AK) 02/12/2018.
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International development groups have also gotten involved in ‘law and order’ vanilla 
initiatives. For example, in 2017, the German Development Agency, GIZ, and the Regional 
SAVA government, drafted a new village ‘Dina Be,’ or the re-writing of ‘local codes of 
conduct,’ which are meant to be written in-sync with existing national laws and regulations and 
be applied across multiple villages in the region (GIZ 2017). This approach seems to resonate 
with many Malagasy village leaders, including mayors and pastors, who commonly advocate 
against public justice, encouraging their constituents to pursue justice through state-sanctioned 
means.32
Industry groups comprised of vanilla firms have also lent their support to campaigns 
against vanilla theft and street justice, launching aggressive anti-theft campaigns, such as the 
‘One-way Ticket for Thieves’ and a second lobbying effort to ‘Ban Vigilante Justice Outright’.33 
International trading companies are motivated in part through their understanding of the intricate 
links between being able to secure enough high-quality vanilla and maintaining their long-
standing relationships with growers. They have also supported security efforts at the local and 
national levels, by giving security related material to farmers (e.g., raincoats, torches, first aid 
kits, and blankets) and paying to transport the thieves to Antananarivo to stand trial away from 
regional networks which are seen as more corrupt. Farmers, with support of firms, have also 
revived the traditional labor-intensive technique of stamping each vanilla pod with their 
individual ‘ID code’ registered with the village commune.
In sum, regional and national Malagasy authorities condemning mob killings implore 
rural residents to adopt strategies of ‘law and order’ sanctioned by the state. Government 
initiatives ‘militarize’ vanilla farmers through state-led trainings with public-private 
contributions. International aid organizations and private vanilla businesses often support these 
efforts. For the regional and national Malagasy government, violence does not denote self-
correcting moral economic relationships but rather a breakdown in the ability to maintain a 
civilized moral order in the margins, thereby indicating the need for the state to take back control 
over violence in rural areas.  
32 Interview HoS/AK 02/12/2018.
33 Interview DCU11/20/2018. This included a large workshop on ‘sensitization on the popular verdict’ 
held in Sambava, financed by the UNDP, and organized by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public 
Security, the Secretary of State of National Gendaremerie, and the Ministry of Public Security and the 
Interior and Decentralization.
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5. Discussion: Bringing together street justice, moral hyper-proximity and the civilized 
commodity
With vanilla prices at historic highs, and incidences of vanilla theft from fields 
widespread, peasant smallholders in Madagascar are experiencing a moral economic 
repositioning between the state and market. Rather than providing protection, state police are 
suspected of exploiting farmers through collusion with thieves. The vanilla market, deregulated 
since the 1990s, also does not offer support to farmers, and instead encourages people to find 
illegal means to profit from the lucrative boom. Farmers resist state and market power in part by 
taking ‘matters into their own hands’ through acts of street justice. Thus, despite differences in 
gender, wealth, and ethnicity, many smallholder producers are finding a broader solidarity 
emerging in the vanilla crisis. This solidarity draws from moral economies that emphasize 
collective action and local autonomy in order to protect land and resources from outside 
encroachment. 
As we note, the actions of smallholder farmers in this context present conceptual and 
empirical links with the existing literature on moral economy and subsistence ethics traditionally 
found within critical agrarian studies (Thompson 1971; Scott 1976; Edelman 2005; Wolford 
2010). This work has been instructive for understanding uneven development between rural 
peasant livelihoods and state and markets. However, our work on the rural moral economies of 
‘street justice’, we argue, also connects more broadly with scholarship characterizing violence in 
urban ‘street’ settings (Pavoni and Tulumello 2018; Karandinos et al. 2014; Anderson’s 1999; 
Bourgois 2003), especially the localized forms of justice materializing in the absence of 
institutional and official forms of adjudication (Spierenburg 2009). Considering moral economic 
change through the lens of street justice can help build a conceptual bridge between rural and 
urban moral economies, especially during periods of economic and social crisis. 
This work also expands the analysis of rural moral economies to extend farther across the 
commodity chain, and highlights the iterative relationships between producers and consumers. 
Such interactions in part stem from the changing realities of global commodity relationships and 
new media platforms, whereby consumers have – or believe that they have–  access to a greater 
quantity of accurate information about conditions of production (West 2012). With the 
proliferation of social media market narratives, block chain technologies, and certifications, 
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Northern consumers feel ever closer to the people producing their products (Goodman 2004; 
Moberg 2014). As we demonstrate, Madagascar vanilla provides a case where potential 
consumers may encounter both positive and negative narratives about production. It is this very 
tension that worries industry experts. While our study does not focus on the behavior or 
decisions of consumers of vanilla, we do examine how downstream market actors in the 
intersecting moral economies of Madagascar’s vanilla boom imagine the possible reactions of 
distant consumers, especially if vanilla becomes known as a ‘blood’ commodity. Indeed, one 
Madagascar vanilla industry expert worried that the widespread condemnation of the incidence 
of violence surrounding the vanilla boom would cause “Madagascar vanilla [to] be the next 
‘blood diamond’ example” for consumers, leading to vanilla boycotts.34 
Government officials and private companies react to escalating rural street violence, and 
the possible market fallout, by imposing stricter discipline on people and agrarian landscapes, 
including surveillance. These ‘civilized’ law and order style responses are meant to discipline the 
behavior of farmers, and to maintain the state monopoly of violence in rural landscapes. This 
process models for farmers the ‘correct’ way to act in a global commodity marketplace, 
according to the beliefs of private businesses, governments, and consumers as to what falls 
within, and outside of, moral limits of behaviors. 35 Overall, governments and markets aim to 
fashion the ‘unruly’ and ‘violent’ vanilla bean into a more ‘civilized commodity.’
The stakes of defining what a civilized commodity looks like – how they are produced, 
circulated, consumed and governed – are high. This is clearly true for smallholder farmers who 
engage in acts of life and death against thieves, but also for consumers as well who are 
increasingly urged to ‘vote with their dollar.’ Thus, just as Elias noted that projects of societal 
rule consistently shift what is considered 'correct' behaviors for civilizing individuals, so too are 
there shifting expectations for the 'behavior' of commodities that circulate in global markets - as 
well as for the consumers of these commodities. Beyond Elias, Foucault’s use of ‘bio-power’ is 
instructive of how disciplinary tools of power and knowledge normatively prescribe behavior 
and to exercise sovereignty over ‘life itself’ (Cavanagh 2018, 405). As Mambe and Meintjes 
(2003, 12) note, ‘…to exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life 
34 Anon Aug.2018
35 the increased use of certification schemes in specialty commodity chains have developed standards by 
which normative behaviors, such as strict working conditions, child labour, quality control, environmental 
and organic standards have been applied to peasant farmers by a northern consumer base (Besky 2013). 
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as the deployment and manifestation of power’. These instruments of disciplinary power emerge 
as a way to legitimize state, and market, control over individuals and populations. 
Yet, this process of commodity 'civilization' largely overlooks the unruly spaces of 
materiality and sociality that mark trade of all sorts, many of which draw from alternative forms 
of power relationships (Dove 2011). In circulating narrow discourses of how 'civilized' 
commodities should behave, these alternate ecologies, economies, and epistemologies can be 
lost, as well as the particular forms of power and meaning that connect with them (Li 2014). 
Further, fashioning a 'civilized commodity' can result in a situation where a commodity system 
outwardly seems to conform with Northern, individualistic notions of justice and morality, while 
obscuring other different types of systematic, structural, and economic violence and injustice 
faced by smallholder farmers (Brown 2013; Alvarez and Coolsaet 2019). 
Critically examining the circulating moral discourses centered on how commodities (and 
farmers) ‘should’ behave can help inform work to create more equitable arrangements for global 
markets. By locating the moral nexus of the smallholder, state, and the market, individuals can 
better locate sites of resistance, especially in our current period when the rise of rural populism 
seems to coincide with new forms of authoritarianism (Bosworth 2018; Mouffe 2018; Scoones et 
al., 2018). Indeed, much of the work of contemporary peasant activists consists of trying to name 
and put in the spotlight the institutional agency - and responsibilities - behind the increasingly 
hard to place state and market entities (Edelman 2005, 332; Scott 1976).The fraught relations of 
the vanilla commodity boom – and the forms of violence it engenders –demonstrates collision of 
market forces, state politics, and agrarian production within increasingly volatile - and 
compressed - relationships of global commodity chains.
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Figure 1: Average Price for Vanilla from 1971 to 2017 (adopted from Nielsen-Massy Vanillas)
Figure 2: Photo from lead story of vanilla from the Financial Times story ‘The real Price of the 
vanilla boom:’ https://www.ft.com/content/02042190-65bc-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56
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Figure 3: Photo from Ft article of executives from Mars Inc. who have come to 
Madagascar on their first trip ever to plan development initiatives in order to stabilize 
farmers’ livelihoods and the market  
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Mob  Justice and ‘The Civilized Commodity’ 
Developing a theory around ‘the civilised commodity’ we expose agrarian crises and ‘mob 
violence’ affecting global high-value products, including the global vanilla price spike in 
Madagascar. We illuminate producers’ labour under such violence, uncertainty, and contradictory 
claims of justice. The underlying question - what counts as justice and to whom - illustrates broader 
arguments regarding producer-consumer ‘moral hyper-proximity’ in an age of social media and 
the systemic and future governance over life under fraught conditions of commodity circulation. 
Calls for a return to ‘law and order,’ albeit important, obscure the structural political 
economic inequities of the ‘everyday’ production of commodities under periodic crisis.
Developing a theory around ‘the civilized commodity’ we examine agrarian crises and the 
resulting ‘mob violence’ affecting high-value global commodities, including the vanilla market 
boom of Madagascar. We illustrate how producers labour under fraught conditions of violence, 
uncertainty, and contradictory claims of moral economy and ‘street justice’. The underlying 
question - what counts as justice and to whom - highlights broader arguments regarding the 
‘moral hyper-proximity’ of producer-consumer relations, and the strategies of state and market 
actors to circulate ‘civilizszed’ visions for the systemic and future governance over commodity 
landscapes. Calls by state and market agencies for a return to ‘law and order,’ however, obscure 
the structural, political, and economic inequities faced by smallholders in their ‘everyday’ 
production of commodities under periodic crisis.
1. Introduction: Commodity Theft, Justice and ‘The Mob’    
It was July of 2017, and we were packed into a village home located in the heart of 
Madagascar’s northeast ‘vanilla triangle’ trying to get some idea of the effects of the price spike 
on local vanilla growers.1 Vanilla bean prices had reached upwards of $600 a kilogram, 
representing nearly a 16-fold price increase to rural vanilla producers since 2013. As may be 
expected in such a boom market, the first thing we noticed about the price spike was the new 
wealth it brought to the area, as everywhere we looked we saw recently purchased consumer 
goods, including off-mark Chinese motorbikes, flashy neon-colored sofas, tin roofing and solar 
panels.2 
However, alongside this newly found wealth came a wave of insecurity and extreme 
anxiousness, as many farmers spoke of sleepless nights in their vanilla fields attempting to ward 
off thieves who wanted to cash in on the high prices. In fact, security concerns overwhelmed our 
1 The ‘we’ here includes the first and fourth author, only. The northeast coastal towns of Sambava, 
Antalaha, Vohemar and Andapa (SAVA) are centrecenter of vanilla-production in Madagascar.
2 It is the country’s primary export crop with proceeds of up to $800 million. For more on the material 
effects on local consumption patterns of the vanilla price spike see Zhu 2018.
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conversations. The head of the one growers’ association, Joseph, stressed, ‘…that when there’s a 
lot of money in the area, there is theft’, and when a thief is caught, more times than not, 
farmersthey are compelled to ‘…take matters into their own hands’.3  When asked why they do 
not just call the police (gendarmes), another grower, Henri, grumbled: ‘we do not trust the 
gendarmes…they are the ones who sell guns to the dahalo [local bandits]’. We then asked what 
they do if they caught a dahalo stealing their vanilla. Joseph replied with a straight but rather 
deadpan expression, ‘dead immediately’.
Although Joseph’s statement was particularly blunt, there is no shortage of such stories of 
‘extra-judicial’ killings and other acts of violence from smallholders across the SAVA region of 
Northeastern Madagascar. Ever sSince the price spike began in 20162, there have been reports of 
increased incidents of vindicte populaire (or fitsaram bahoaka in Malagasy), acts we refer to in 
this discussion as ‘street’ or ‘mob justice’ to denote the contextual realities of village streets, 
where historically violence motivated by vanilla theft is taking place sometimes by individuals, 
but also in groups.4 While vigilante justice is not a new phenomenon in rural Madagascar (e.g. 
Sharp 1990), with the current price spike, these events are now more frequent and violent.5  In 
2017 alone, it was reported that over 100 people, both thieves and farmers, were killed in the 
vanilla producing region of Andapa, located in the western part of the vanilla triangle. the most 
western city of the vanilla producing region of Madagascar, Andapa. 
While this uptick in violence is deeply disturbing, it would be simplistic to chalk up such 
violent responses by smallholders as ‘irrational’ or ‘chaotic’ actions taken by a desperate and 
precarious peasant class. On the contrary, the almost mundane descriptions of reprisals to vanilla 
theft, and the lack of response by Malagasy state authorities, signals a desire to seek out 
alternative forms of social justice in the wake of the price spike.  In the absence of state and 
market mechanisms of support, many farmers currently regard ‘taking matters into their own 
hands’ as the most effective avenue to safeguard their livelihoods. Farmers look towards street 
justice primarily as a means of protecting their crops, but also as a form of ‘symbolic resistance’ 
3 Anonymous interviews (July 16 2017).
4 We want to stress that vigilante justice is a not a new phenomenon in rural Madagascar (e.g. 
Sharp 1990), asFor example, in some areas of Madagascar, there is a tradition of mob violence 
for certain grave infractions, such as stealing bones from ancestral tombs, but as we show is now 
more frequent, violent and much more visible by a global audience with the onset of new media. 
5 For example, in some areas of Madagascar, there is a tradition of mob violence for certain grave serious 
infractions, such as stealing bones from ancestral tombs. 
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against the gendarmes who smallholders suspect of deputizing thieves to steal from farmers on 
behalf of state officials. These acts of vigilante justice by smallholders effectively challenge the 
state’s legitimacy over the use of force and over delineating sanctioned punishments against 
crime (Weber 2013; Mbembé 2003). 
In such ways, mMob violence is situated as a question of agrarian moral economy within 
which, despite differences in gender, class, and ethnicity, ‘a broader solidarity emerges’ in 
response to structural injustices imposed by the state and market forces (Neumann 2002, 42; see 
also Edelman 2005; Wolford 2010). In Madagascar, tThe moral economic relationships of 
smallholder vanilla farmers are embedded within the neoliberal market reforms and deregulation 
of the vanilla market during the mid-1990s (McMichael 2009). While smallholders have been 
dealing with price variations for nearly twenty-five years, the current price spike has precipitated 
a crisis for rural communities that has engendered particularly acute levels of violence and 
mistrust. Thus, In the vanilla market, as with peasant commodity production more generally, 
smallholders who are facing the loss of their livelihoods recalibrate their moral sensibilities 
around violence within the context of ‘boom and bust’ dynamics. In the case of rural 
Madagascar, tThis recalibration is breaking down certain existing moral economic relationships 
within communities, including creating heightened suspicions between neighbors, and even 
between members of the same family. At the same time, the vanilla crisis is also reinforcing 
other collective relationships, as individual farmers work together to organize patrols and 
mobilize shared security measures, including mob violence events.. For example, in a few cases, 
younger individuals are stealing vanilla from the fields of elder members of their family, 
upending Malagasy moral codes of respecting elders.
The moral economy of rural street justice also influences, and is influenced by, multiple 
intersecting relationships of power that extend beyond local levels of production, however. For 
example, acts of mob violence are becoming increasingly visible to those living outside of rural 
Madagascar, as accounts of ‘vanilla violence’ reach a global audience through high profile media 
outlets.6 These accounts are similar to international news stories that highlight the violence 
connected with other high value commodities, such as ‘blood diamonds’ (Le Billon 2000), cacao 
(Dhariwal 2012), and avocados (Brown 2013). Reading these depictions in the media, 
downstream market actors, such as multinational companies and , commodity suppliers, 
6 Examples are NYTimes, Guardian, the Economist.
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4
experience their own moral narratives of street justice in Madagascar's villagesbecome anxious , 
and consumers in U.S. and Europe,that consumers will turn away from products that use ‘blood’ 
vanilla.7  experience their own moral narratives of street justice in Madagascar's villages. 
The circulation of these stories illustrate what we call a ‘moral hyper-proximity’ of global 
commodities –  the changing dynamics of producer-consumer relations in an age of high-speed 
media, where information about of the conditions of commodity production travels faster and in 
a greater diversity of forms (c.f. Goodman et al. 2017; Büscher and Igoe 2013; Anderson 2014; 
Goodman et al 2016). Moral hyper-proximity brings ideas of what producers and consumers 
each believe to be 'fair' dynamics of commodity production and trade relationships into more 
immediate contact through diverse social media platforms platforms (Besky 2008; Moberg and 
Lyon 2010; West 2012). For example, mMany of the circulating media stories on mob violence 
in the vanilla market emphasize the preference for ‘law and order’ structures to prevail, linking 
this outcome with best serving farmers.8 Theishese accounts, and the international attention 
surrounding they are bringing to Madagascar’s vanilla industry is forcing the Malagasy 
Madagascar’s government to take action to reclaim authority and moral legitimacy over law 
enforcement, including through the increased militarization of the spaces of commodity 
production. While well-meaning, media accounts that frame commodity violence through a lens 
of ‘law and order’ – and that advocate for the better enforcement through courts and draconian 
state measures –also obfuscate the deeper structural issues of the price spike, most namely, the 
historical economic marginalization of a peasant class(Thompson 1971; Scott 1976). We refer to 
these conditions as moral hyper-proximity. Hyper-proximity compresses differing frameworks 
for morality as consumers are increasingly exposed to the idea that their purchasing decisions are 
simultaneously an avenue to comment what forms of exchange are fair and desirable (Moberg 
and Lyon 2010).Moral hyper-proximity compresses not only the economic spaces of trade – 
eliminating certain nodes of middlemen exchange between producer and consumer (Harvey 
2002) – but also ideological spaces (Tsing 2015; Anderson 2014; Bair and Werner 2014). 
Through social media and other outlets, consumers can quickly learn about forms of production 
connected with the products, and to imagine themselves as imbricated in the lives of producers 
7 For example, see: https://old.danwatch.dk/en/undersogelseskapitel/du-risikerer-at-koebe-stjaalen-
vanilje-i-supermarkedet/
8 This notion of justice commonly aligns with discussions of literature largely based on western traditions 
of moral individualism (c.f. Rawls, 2005; Martinez-Alier et al. 2016; Temper et al 2015).
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5
(West 2012). Many times, these messages emphasize positive effects of trade, such as the 
community benefits of Fair Trade or the environmental benefits of organic certification. 
However, in the cases the messaging can be disturbing, detailing the exploitation and harm 
brought by existing systems with more powerful entities subjecting people, and environments, to 
forms of violence (c.f. Le Billon 2000). Making visible the harmful aspects of commodities can 
lead to successful organization of consumer activism that exerts public and financial pressure on 
corporations to improve labour conditions for smallholder farmers, or factory workers (Bair and 
Werner 2014). 
Below, Wwe elaborate on the concepts of moral economy and moral hyper-proximity in 
the context of street violence of the vanilla boom. We argue that power struggles over defining 
the just governance of commodity relationships emerge in part as struggles over the right to 
claim moral authority over the disciplining of material and discursive landscapes, in order toin 
attempts to delineate how people involved in commodity production and trade ‘should’ behave 
(Cavanaugh 2018, 405; Goodman et al. 2017; Death and Gabay 2015). In attempts tTo bridge 
these diverse concepts, Specifically, what counts as justice, and morality, and to whom? What if 
the outcomes considered ‘just’ by smallholder farmers are not the ones many expect? Can extra-
judicial killings be justified, or even glorified, in the name of smallholder justice? 
wWe mobilize Norbert Elias’ (2000; vol. 1; 1982; 1969; vol 2 1982) classic work, The 
Civilizing Process, to illustrate the historical and political conditions through which societies are 
managed. ed and , and apply these concepts to explore the theory of ‘the civilized commodity’ or 
the systemic governance over life under the fraught moral conditions of increasingly violent 
commodity circulation (Le Billon 2005). Elias signals micro-level changes in human behavior 
alongside periods of economic transformation and specialization in the late 18th Century 
(Durkheim 1893),; when labour shifts brought social classes (e.g., the ‘village’ cobbler and the 
Bourgeois merchant),, normally kept apart,, in more frequent contact. This new proximity 
contact between ‘unlike social classes’ altered how people acted and presumably instilled when 
in closer proximity, and thus, instilled a ‘civilizing processes’ of learned behaviors from the 
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6
courtly social classes ‘downward.’9 Thesebehaviors included , ,such as  and. state reified theover 
time sIn his later work, Elias (1982) thought of the civilizing process as essential to building of 
the nation-state, with newly formed governments both reinforcing ‘appropriate behaviors’ to 
reinforcebolster state legitimacy,  and enforce tax collection, and most noteworthy, to 
maintainning a monopoly on violence., This governance aims to regulate commodity landscapes 
both now, and pre-emptively for future conditions of production and consumption (Massumi 
2015; Büscher 2018). Such debates intersect with the cultural norms of what people believe to be 
appropriate individual and societal behaviors. In the mid-20 Century, Elias (1939: Vol .1, 1969; 
Vol 2, 1982) detailed changes in social behavior and psychology in the social structures of 
European societies over the longue durée between the European Middle Ages and 18th Century. 
Elias exhibited how societal expectations of ‘appropriate behavior’ or how ‘one should act’ has 
changed over time. This surrounded everything from table manners, bodily functions, nose 
blowing and spitting, sleeping, to sexual relations and aggression. 
Elias makes a point in signaling periods of economic transformation and specialization in 
the late 18th Century (Durkheim 1893); when labour shifts brought social classes (e.g., the 
‘village’ cobbler and the Bourgeois merchant), normally kept apart, in more frequent contact. 
This new contact between ‘unlike social classes’ altered how people acted when in closer 
proximity, and thus, instilled a ‘civilizing processes’ of learned behaviors, such as the capacity of 
foresight, rationalization and self-restraint; and the internalization of negative emotions (e.g. 
anxiety, disgust), originating from courtly societies and upper classes downward onto the general 
population. These behaviors were over time subsequently reified through social sanction and 
other disciplining tools by the state (Foucault 1998; Weber 1993). For instance, in his later work, 
Elias (1982) thought of the civilizing process as essential to building of the nation-state with 
newly formed governments both reinforcing ‘appropriate behaviors’ to reinforce state legitimacy 
and enforce tax collection, and most noteworthy, maintaining a monopoly on violence. 
Although Elias details the social psychological changes of societies over time, Foucault’s 
use of ‘bio-power’ describes how disciplinary forms of power and knowledge have come to 
‘normatively prescribe how both individuals and populations should behave’ (Cavanagh 2018, 
9 These behaviours included the capacity of foresight, rationalization, self-restraint, and the internalization 
of negative emotions such as anxiety and disgust. The state reified these behaviours over time through 
social sanctions and other disciplining tools (Foucault 1998; Weber 1993).
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7
405) and to exercise sovereignty in order to have the power to ‘define life’ itself. As Mambe and 
Meintjes (2003, 12) note, ‘…to exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to 
define life as the deployment and manifestation of power’. Similar to Elias’ later work on the 
nation-state, Foucault (1991) draws on the sovereign state and its populations in the post-
Enlightenment period and the emergence of scientific measurement and regulation as 
instruments to foster progress in health and living conditions. These new instruments of 
disciplinary power emerge as a way to legitimize the state control over individuals and of broad 
swaths of the population more generally (Cavanagh 2018). 
Working from Elias, we explore the theory of ‘the civilized commodity,’ or the systemic 
governance over life under the fraught moral conditions of increasingly violent commodity 
circulation (Le Billon 2005). We usePlacing the civilized commodity in conversation with street 
justice, moral economy and moral hyper-proximity and highlights connections between 
liberalized boom/bust markets and the structural political economic inequities of the ‘everyday’ 
production under periodic crisis. To many, commodity violence and street justice contrasts with 
the ‘civilized’ versions of how commodity production should look – transparent, controlled by 
state and market forces, and connected to the state and market control and the delivery of 
economic and social benefits and development (West 2012). – and therebyThus, farmers in 
Madagascar taking matters into their own hands becomes for downstream market actors an 
unseemly and ‘un-civilized’ way to resolve disputes.10
Below Specifically, what counts as justice, and morality, and to whom? What if the 
outcomes considered ‘just’ by smallholder farmers are not the ones many expect? Can  extra-
judicial killings be justified, or even glorified, in the name of smallholder justice? 
To consider these questions, wwe first first provide a brief overview of moral economic 
theory within the agrarian studies tradition. We bring this literature into conversation with work 
on street justice in urban settings and with other forms of commodity violence, and argue for the 
potential for further work examining the  beyond vanilla which we argue has potential for future 
work drawing on important, yet less studied, parallels of street violence between rural and urban 
10 Alongside Elias, our use of civilizing here is not meant to be teleological or progression towards a 
superior model of behaviour or values, rather to show a critique to such thinking in a period of speed up 
and deregulated trade.
Page 35 of 68
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjps  Email: JPS.Editorial@gmail.com





























































For Peer Review Only
8
settings. Drawing mainly from ethnographic work with Malagasy smallholder vanilla farmers 
and other actors in the vanilla industry, we provide a detailed account of the material relations, 
historical dynamics, and cultural meaning of vanilla production and trade in the region. We 
consider the commodity crisis from the smallholders’ perspective in comparison to other market 
actors, including middlemen collectors and larger exporters. In addition to participant 
observation research, we draw on over 288 socio-economic surveys with Malagasy vanilla 
growers, small-scale farmers, and 40 semi-structured interviews with collectors, exporters, 
government officials and industry experts.11 We consider the commodity crisis from the 
smallholders’ perspective in comparison to other market actors, including middlemen collectors 
and larger exporters. We draw on over 288 socio-economic surveys with both male and female 
vanilla growers of different levels of income and 40 semi-structured interviews with collectors, 
exporters, government officials and industry experts.12 We discuss the heterogeneity of vanilla 
growers and their different perspectives of violence,  on smallholders and consider various media 
accounts describing Madagascar’s vanilla boom and street justice events. We demonstrate that in 
a period of sped up consumer producer relations, the state and market react to peasant violence 
with ‘civilized’ law and order style responses meant to discipline the behavior of farmers, 
landscapes, and commodities. Actions, which we show, that are meant to demonstrate state 
legitimacy and to maintain the state monopoly of violence in rural landscapes.  
We also consider various media accounts describing Madagascar’s vanilla boom and street justice events 
connected with vanilla. Overall, despite, ethnicityrepositioning, , and marketA TRY: Overall, despite 
differences in gender, wealth, ethnicity and other factors, peasant smallholders find a broader solidarity 
emerge in the vanilla boom crisis. Farmers are experiencing a moral economic repositioning between the 
peasantry, state, and market. Rather than providing protection, state police are exploiting farmers and the 
spaces left in ‘the market’ since deregulation. Street justice is one form of peasant resistance to the state. 
However, as we show, in a period of sped up consumer producer relations, the state and market react to 
peasant violence with ‘civilized’ law and order style responses meant to discipline the behavior of 
11 This work was conducted over the 2016-17 vanilla campaign within the region of SAVA and in the UK 
and USA. The survey was administered by CURSA, a regional University based in Antalaha, 
Madagascar.
12 This work was conducted over the 2016-17 vanilla campaign within the region of SAVA and in the UK 
and USA. The survey was administered by CURSA, a regional University based in Antalaha, 
Madagascar.
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9
farmers, landscapes, and commodities. These actions are also meant to demonstrate state legitimacy and 
to maintain the state monopoly of violence in rural landscapes.  
To close we put forward the concept of the civilized commodity that places conceptions of street 
justice and moral economy into the context of the moral hyper-proximity of compressed relations 
of global commodity production and trade. We highlight connections between boom markets, 
street justice, and the structural political economic inequities of the ‘everyday’ production of 
commodities under periodic crisis. n.
2. Moral Economy and the limits of the state
It has been over fifty years since EP Thompson’s adoption of the term ‘moral economy’ in his 
seminal essay (1971) ‘The moral economy of the English working crowds in the eighteenth-
century.’ In the essay, Thompson explores the ‘bread-wage nexus’ and the condition of the ‘rural 
underclasses’ who rioted against uneven taxation and unfair pricing of grain. These ‘bread riots’ 
represented for Thompson, ‘direct popular action, disciplined and with clear objectives’ against 
market injustices and not thoughtless ‘rebellions of the belly’ caused by angry ‘mobs’.13 
Thomson’s view is that the riots were a function of a ‘moral economy’ among the peasant classes 
based on identifiable and agreed upon ‘…social norms and obligations, of the proper economic 
functions’ which were infringed upon within changing political economic conditions (1971, 79; 
see also Wolford and Keene 2015, 576). For Thompson, there was little doubt that the bread riots 
had popular support and were legitimized by an overwhelming belief that ‘in times of dearth, the 
regulation of prices ought to be enforced, and those responsible in doing so must be held 
accountable’ (1971, 113). 
Thompson’s treatise on moral economy laid the foundation for future scholars concerned 
with social movements of peasants, particularly in times of dearth and economic change. James 
Scott, for example, examined how peasants resisted navigated a similar moral terrain of rights 
and expectations to that of Thompson. Rather than mob justice, Scott’s analysis, displayed 
tensions between landlords and farmers which boiled over due to subtle pressure points, 
especially and mainly in the unfair extraction of rent. As a result, peasants engaged in ‘small’ 
acts of resulting in subtle forms or For Scott, small acts of ‘everyday resistance’ – from work 
slowdowns to petty theft − whereas a way for peasants in Southeast Asia to express their own 
13  This was not against wages as expressed in more nineteenth century direct action (1971, 79).
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brand of ‘economic justice’ (1976, 3).’ Similarly to Thompson, this peasant response was ‘…not 
just a problem of calories and income but [is a] question of peasant conceptions of social justice, 
of rights and obligations, of reciprocity’ (Scott, 1976, vii). Scott’s work was instrumental in 
critical agrarian studies. According to Edelman, one of Scott’s transformative contributions was 
to bridge critical scholarship focused on states and structure with that of the peasant’s everyday 
social reproduction and labour allocation (2005, 334). As Edelman explains:
Scott maintains that village level systems of reciprocity produce, over long historical time, 
widely held moral expectations.14 Market forces (sometimes in combination with 
environmental ones) pose challenges to these expectations and may, when thresholds of what 
is culturally acceptable are crossed, produce rebellion and collective resistance.
To varying degrees each of these contributions described peasant conceptions of local struggles 
within a changing political economy and how peasant navigate changing ethical and moral issues 
of reciprocity, values and justice around within a shifting ‘subsistence substance ethic’ (Scott, 
1976 see also Chayanov 1966). This subsistence substance ethic went beyond the quotidian 
requirements of meeting ‘brute physiological needs’ to also encompass the subjective 
experiences accumulated in periods of formed the subjective experiences to political economic 
crisis that peasants builtd up over time, in addition to what is required to meet their every 
dayeveryday ‘brute physiological needs’(1976, 17). In Scott’s analysis tensions between 
landlords and farmers boiled over at subtle pressure points, mainly in the unfair extraction of 
rent. Thompson’s analysis which describes in detail how, groups of angry peasant resisted in 
organized mobs signaling to the predatory state that they were not providing protection for its 
peasantry from market exploitation.  
Critical scholars have since applied Since, tthe concept of moral economy has been 
applied by critical scholars to a variety of geographic spaces and across multiple scales, 
including landless farmers in Brazil (Wolford 2010), and shifting cultivators (Kull 2004)  and 
agropastoralists (Gingembre 2015) in Madagascar, and (Kull 2004) to drug traffickers in 
Northern Philadelphia (Karandinos et al. 2014) toand  Fair Trade markets South Africa (McEwan 
et al 2017). Many of these scholars diverge in their conceptual usage of moral economy, yet all 
14 Others such as Eric Wolf, Benjamin Moore and other scholars in the French school of Agricultural 
Sciences, more generally used the concept of moral economy the in calling out of ‘markets’ as spaces of 
political contestation and struggle.
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in some way draw attention to what Neumann (2002, 37) remarks as the shifting ‘…norms, 
values, and expectations related to the livelihoods of subordinate classes during major economic 
transformations’ (see also: McCarthy 2002; Moore 1998).
Moral economy and street violence
Less effective, however, has been the adoption of moral economy to understand its close 
association with diverse forms of to ‘justice,’ in particular, the less understood concept of ‘street 
justice’ or vindicte populaire.  15Our discussion aims to bridge these two bodies of literature, by 
placing street justice as enacted by smallholders into moral economic framings that foreground 
the intersections of liberalized markets and state vulnerability. 
It is within such a context that Malagasy farmers resort to street violence to protect their vanilla 
resources− an act we understand in this case to be, in part, a particular form of commodity 
violence. This violence is not random, however, but is situated within broader moral economic 
relationships between farmers, states, and commodity markets. As violence escalates, certain 
aspects of these moral economic relationships begin to break-down, as distrust grows between 
and among farmers, Malagasy state officials, and market actors.
 The escalating violence associated with the vanilla boom parallels similar forms of 
violence associated with high value commodities, especially within largely deregulated markets. 
For example, cacao production in Africa has long been associated with violence and the 
exploitation of children (Financial times 2018), including a wave of rural violence in 
Madagascar in 2012 during the global cacao boom when armed thieves stole cacao pods from 
smallholders (Dhariwal 2012). The diamond trade is notorious for its reliance on "conflict" 
diamonds obtained through systematic violence and outright conflict and is often cited as an 
example of ‘resource wars’ (Le Billon 2004, 1). The liberalization of access and control to 
valuable commodities, such as conflict minerals, oil, or timber, and commodity crops many 
times exacerbates historical tensions of uneven development and marginalization, which which 
at timesmay also leads to widespread violence, including organized armed conflicts (Watts and 
Peluso 2001). Other work on ‘neoliberal commodity economies’ points to the larger structural 
15 Originally understood in the French Ag. School as ‘mentalities populaire’; while Thompson uses 
‘mob;’ we also adopt the term ‘street’ in order to navigate the naturalizing connotations of ‘mob 
mentality’ and denote that village streets are subject to violence similar to social connections found also 
within urban contexts (see Pavoni and Tulumello 2018; Karandinos et al. 2014).  
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violence intrinsic within to even outwardly nonviolent trade relationship, especially for the low-
wage, comparatively disenfranchised individuals within international commodity relationships 
(Nevins and Peluso 2008).
The ‘street justice’ killings of vanilla thieves in Madagascar are another form of 
commodity violence, which presents both similarities and differences to the above examples. In 
considering these forms of violence, wWe adopt the term ‘street justice’ for two main reasons. 
First, the use of the word ‘street’ helps we wish to in order to navigate the naturalizing 
connotations of ‘mob mentality’ and its suggestion of irrational behaviors. Second, we aim to 
denote that village streets are subject to social forms of violence similar to social connections 
found alsothat noted within urban contexts, especially in places which have been subjected to 
periods of austerity and neglect (see Pavoni and Tulumello 2018).  For example, oOur study on 
the ‘mobilizing of violence’ in village streets, somewhat follows Karandinos et al. (2014) and 
Anderson’s (1999) work on drug gangs in inner-city Philadelphia. In this work, street violence is 
not necessarily random or chaotic, but often directed by individual or groups following 
understood ‘codes of the street’ (Bourgois 2003).  or as Karandinos et al. (2014, 1) describe 
itsuch codes as a ‘ethical norms and obligations which are recognized as legitimate’ reactions by 
locals as a way to navigate moral economic and social change and crisis. 
These reactions, however unseemly and ‘uncivilized’ to outsiders, are a way for localized 
justice to take place when the main arbitrator of justice, the state, is absent (Spierenburg 2009).  
violence thatThe dynamics between weak states, changing neoliberal markets, and mob violence have 
been described in other regions as well (Abrahams 1998). For example, a wave of street justice violence 
and lynching in Bolivia was described as a mechanism for communities to ‘take law into their own 
hands’" in frustration with the lack of state response against rampant crime (Goldstein 2003). In this way, 
Goldstein demonstrates thatargues, "“vigilantism acts as a moral complaint against state inadequacy, 
challenging state legitimacy and redefining ideas about justice, citizenship, and law in the process (2003, 
22).” Similarly Smith, writing of the vigilante justice group in Nigeria known as the Bakassi boys notes 
that this violent vigilante group mobilized to killed suspected criminals in response to perceived failure of 
the state to safeguard citizen's property and basic rights during a time of intensified market reforms and 
economic change (2004).  we also adopt the term ‘street’ in order to navigate the naturalizing 
connotations of ‘mob mentality’ and denote that village streets are subject to violence similar to social 
connections found also within urban contexts (see Pavoni and Tulumello 2018; Karandinos et al. 2014).  
Page 40 of 68
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjps  Email: JPS.Editorial@gmail.com





























































For Peer Review Only
13
To bring together these frameworks – commodity violence, street justice, and moral 
economy - we turn to the empirical case of 'street justice' violence in Madagascar surrounding 
the vanilla boom, which illustrates how ideas of moral economy and street ideas of justice 
intersect in the context of commodity production and trade. . We then ask what the vanilla crisis 
can tell us about the intersections of moral economy and justice in the context of economic 
volatility and uncertainty, as Malagasy farmers increasingly take matters of justice ‘into their 
own hands.’. 
3.  Overview of vanilla cultivation and trade in Madagascar
The current dynamics of Madagascar’s 'street violence' need to beare situated within broader 
economic, political, and environmental contexts of global commodity production and trade. In 
particular, we see the crisis tied directly to the deregulation of commodities markets in the 1990s. 
Albeit While mob justice is not necessarily new form of violence in Madagascar, this 
deregulation is a key point of departure for us to better understand the connections betweenjust 
how connected the political and moral economy of street justice, is to global commodity circuits, 
and the historical roll-back of state power and legitimacy in rural Madagascar. 
Vanilla wais thought to be introduced to Réunion, Mauritius, and then Madagascar in the 
early 1800s by the French who were looking to establish commercial plantations (Havkin-
Frenkel et al. 2010). Their initial attempts were stymied, however, due of the lack of a natural 
pollinator found in vanilla’sits native regions of Mexico and wider regions of Central America. 
This all changed in around the 1840s when a viable, but labour intensive, method of hand 
pollination was discovered.16 With this discovery, the French were essentially able to 
monopolize vanilla cultivation in Madagascar and the neighbouring territories. 
After Madagascar gained independence in 1960, the new socialist government instituted 
regulations on the vanilla trade, aimed at stabilizing prices and global supplies. Though 
providing some security for farmers during the ensuing decades, there also emerged entrenched 
alliances between political and economic interests, as the vanilla market became marked by 
corruption and opaque relationships of trade. Then, under pressure from international monetary 
agencies, Madagascar deregulated the vanilla trade in the 1990s, leading eventually to highly 
volatile market conditions marked by dramatic booms and prolonged bust periods (Laney and 
16 In Mexico, the plant is pollinated by melipona bees and hummingbirds. 
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Turner 2015; Cadot et al. 2010). One of these price spikes occurred in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, exasperated by a cyclone that destroyed much of Madagascar's vanilla harvest. This boom 
was followed by a rapid price crash, with prices falling to below $40/kg (see Figure 1 below).    
While many vanilla farmers elsewhere around the globe largely abandoned vanilla cultivation 
during the prolonged bust market, which stretched the decade between 2005 and 2015, many 
Malagasy farmers continued to cultivate vanilla, dependent on the crop and with few other 
options (Osterhoudt 2017). The current boom market, with vanilla prices once again rising 
overnearing 6$500/kg, thus arrives after a decade-long period of hardship and struggle for rural 
households in vanilla producing regions of Madagascar.17
Figure 1: Average Price for Vanilla from 1971 to 2017 (adopted from Nielsen-Massy Vanillas)
Today, Madagascar still continues to dominates production in the global vanilla market. Its 
branded variety ‘Bourbon,’ is the industry’s 'gold standard,' recognised for its unique and diverse flavour 
profile. It is Madagascar’s leading agricultural export, valued at approximately valued annually at roughly 
over $800 million per year (OEC 2017). This Madagascar’s hold over the market is no accident; the 
region maintains the ideal microclimate for vanilla cultivation, with suitable conditions of moisture and 
temperature for vanilla flowering. Yet, its global dominance owes more to theits availability of cheap 
labour essential for commercial production. Vanilla is a labour-intensive crop and its cultivation This 
includes the incredibly arduous tasks of hand pollination, a long growing period, and a lengthy four- 
months process of traditional sun-curing beans without which, some say, it loses its quality. Many 
Malagasy households depend on vanilla income to meet basic needs, and thus invest the time and labour 
into cultivation and curing. Peasants’ dependence on the vanilla trade is no secret in the industry, as 
frequent discussions with exporters highlighted how in times of high or low prices, Malagasy farmers will 
continue to produce a vanilla harvest. As noted in a recent article in the Financial Times, ‘Not only is its 
climate perfect, but it is also one of the few places on earth poor enough to make the laborious process of 
hand pollination worthwhile’. 18 
This farmer dependence on vanilla income is seen in the villages that are the site of our 
ethnographic research. These rural communities are situated within the main site for vanilla 
17 In addition to market deregulation and cyclone events, vanilla price spikes are also connected with the 
increase in illegal rosewood trafficking in the region (Zhu 2018).
18 Access at: https://www.ft.com/content/02042190-65bc-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56 (July 12, 2018).
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production in Madagascar, known as the ‘vanilla triangle’ of the SAVA district. The region 
comprises of around 800 villages scattered across over 23 thousand km with two main ethnic 
groups – the costal ‘Betsimisaraka’ and the ‘Tsimihety’ who occupy the higher altitudes making 
up the majority of the estimated 80-100 thousand vanilla farmers in the region.19 
Nevertheless, eEven though the vanillathis region remains growing region remains one of 
Madagascar's wealthiest, and some farmers seem to be doing well financially under the current 
boom, the majority of peasant smallholders, who have access to less than 5 ha of land, still 
remain relatively poor and few economic choices, with many living off less than $2/day. 
Households in this area also struggled during the previous decade, with the prolonged bust of the 
vanilla market – a situation further exasperated by cyclone events, political uncertainty and 
government corruption that also beset the region during these years.. The region comprises of 
around 800 villages scattered across over 23 thousand km with two main ethnic groups – the 
costal ‘Betsimisaraka’ and the ‘Tsimihety’ who occupy the higher altitudes making up the 
majority of the estimated 80-100 thousand vanilla farmers in the region.20 
Many households depend on vanilla income to meet basic needs and peasants’ 
dependence on the vanilla trade is no secret in the industry, as frequent discussions with 
exporters highlighted how in times of high or low prices, Malagasy will produce. As noted in a 
recent article in the Financial Times, ‘Not only is its climate perfect, but it is also one of the few 
places on earth poor enough to make the laborious process of hand pollination worthwhile’. 21
4. Theft and ‘Street Justice’ in the Vanilla Boom
In this context of prolonged, economic hardship, intense labor requirements, and d
eecades of collusion and corruption between certain state and market forces, the theft of 
vanilla hits smallholder farmers particularly hard. Exasperating the challenge of vanilla security 
in the absence of reliable state and legal institutions is the materiality of the vanilla plant itself, 
19 The French, the Chinese, Indo-Pakistanis and those of varied Arab descent arrived for the vanilla trade 
starting toward the end of the 19th century. Many Chinese have since intermarried with the Betsimisaraka 
and Tsimihety and occupy an outsized role in vanilla and other valuable commodities in the region (Zhu 
2016). 
20 The French, the Chinese, Indo-Pakistanis and those of varied Arab descent arrived for the vanilla trade 
starting toward the end of the 19th century. Many Chinese have since intermarried with the Betsimisaraka 
and Tsimihety and occupy an outsized role in vanilla and other valuable commodities in the region (Zhu 
2016). 
21 Access at: https://www.ft.com/content/02042190-65bc-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56 (July 12, 2018).
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which is a relatively easy crop to steal. It is an orchid grown in multistoried ‘garden’ systems 
called taniboly located in relatively far distance from village homes and . under customary and 
very insecure customary tenure systems.  Beans develop on the vines between March and July, 
when they are vulnerable to theft, especially in May and June when the beans are relatively ripe 
but the official vanilla market in Madagascar has not yet opened. Thieves take advantage of this 
‘lag time’ to steal green vanilla off the vine as the pods are easily swiped off without much effort 
and depending on moisture content relatively light to haul away. We found in our survey of 288 
growers in the southern SAVA city of Antalaha, that over 58 percent (n=167) sell their vanilla 
early and still immature, and over 55 percent (n=159) said they do so that ‘no one will steal it’.22 
The distress of the theft and subsequent violence is having a severe effect on the social 
and economic relations between individual vanilla growers. Over 62 percent (n=111) responded 
that their life has become ‘much more difficult’ since the price spike began in 2014. Although the 
somewhat sizable minority of 36% (n= 105) did say that having ‘more money helped make life 
easier,’ the security situation was identified as the number one issue confronting all those 
surveyed, with 69 percent (n=199) saying that ‘security has gotten worse’ since the price spike. 
Moreover, 81 percent (n=232) responded that they have had their vanilla stolen or were affected 
by attempted theft. 
While vanilla theft is not a new phenomenon, the recent price spike has set off a 
particular harshness to the violence unforeseen not as often seen in this region in the past, as 
farmers organize against potential vanilla bandits through measures that include direct and 
sometimes even deadly force through 'street justice' events. 
In this region of Madagascar, a street justice event typically beings when a suspected 
thief is caught in someone’s vanilla fields, usually at night. Such thieves could be spotted by a 
farmer keeping watch over his or her field, or by a community patrol, or by a guard hired to 
secure particular fields. Once a thief is apprehended, people sound the alarm through shouting 
and running through town, calling others to join the group. Many times, the thief is badly beaten  
up or killed. Thieves may be local to the area, or from outside the region. Usually, iIf the story of 
such reportedstreet violence ‘stays local’ – meaning it does not get reported outside the region - 
sState officials usually do not punish those who participate.  However, as we see below, the 
state’sis is response changesing ifas reports of street justice get out into international news, as 
22 ‘n’ refers to the total number of the 288 respondents who shoeschoose this answer.
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Malagasy authorities need to act and maintain what seems to be a question of theirthe appearance 
of legitimacy over market order. 
There were mMany vanilla growers in Madagascar who commented on the ‘cozy’ 
relationships between thieves and state authorities, including gendarmes and high court officials, 
who both either refused to step inhalt, or were in some way complicit in, vanilla theft. This belief 
led to a which lead in some way to ‘mistrust of the official justice system’ and the subsequent 
perceived need for farmers to ‘take matters into their own hands’. Only 21 percent (n= 61) of 
growers surveyed said that they felt thieves were ever ‘caught’, (meaningalso meant brought to 
some sort of official justice) while 72 percent (n=206) said that ‘nothing was ever done’ about 
it’,about reported vanilla thefts. and even wWorse, some smallholders went on to saysaid that 
that the gendarmes (state police forces) wereare ‘colluding with local villagers and 
intermediaries, giving them the tools and protection to steal.’’. One farmer noted: "There are 
plenty of personnel of the State Executive (National Police and Court of Justice or even 
Government Officials) who have aaAs Aina, onean older male vanilla grower described it, 
whothere are many police, court and government officials who  have a  ‘relationship’ to the 
thieves’,.23 and and Another noted that, ‘…when thieves are caught they are let go soon after.’ 
Aina They went on to say:
Let me explain what happens here. When we have caught the thi ves, we hand them 
over to the authorities (Police National). However, the problem is that the thieves have 
paid the responsible officers and they are liberated afterwards…24
This collusion often continues after thieves Ever after, they are  arrested and are meant to stand 
trial:
They (the thieves) are rich but that does not restrain them from stealing. What is more, 
when we have filed the case at the court of justice, they withdraw the case since the 
thieves and their bosses have the financial means (to corrupt the judges) and the poor 
cannot do anything about it.25
This is not to say that theft of vanilla was not always an issue – as 67 percent (n=192) of 
respondents say that ‘theft has always been a problem’. However, it seems that the mechanisms 
that were once in place to protect vanilla growers and punish thieves bring those caught to justice 
23 Anon July 2017
24 Anon July 2017
25 Anon Aug 2017
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have broken down at the same time as the economic stakes of vanilla thefts have been raised. 
With vanilla prices at record highs, more people are taking the risk to steal.  sue to the sheer 
severity of violence during the boom
The rise in thefts are disrupting local relationships, as many suspect that vanilla thieves 
are individuals from their own communities, or even their own family. ; in particular, before 
market reforms took hold in the 1990s. As noted by some local by, Herimanoa, a male grower of 
organic certified vanillagrowers, “they [thieves] are those living close, commission agents as 
well as authorities distribute money among young people. It is this act which obliges them to 
steal."26 It was explained to us, that ‘local recruits’ have the advantage of knowing your 
movements and whereabouts and therefore know when you are away.: And sSometimes the 
practice of recruiting from local villages pitsting family members against each other:  "In my 
opinion it is our children who dare to steal vanilla from their own fathers in our own fields,." 
responded Hery, a moderately-wealthy smallholder.27  One common response we frequently 
heard was that local youth are more generally responsible for the act of stealing. Many said that 
they are actively recruited by both ‘commissionaires’ (middlemen) and financed by regional 
police. As expressed noted by Lalaina, a female another grower who at times just gets by 
financiallyliving on the economic margins, 
Commissionaires incentivize local people to steal, and it is them who then buy the stolen vanilla. In 
fact, there was a thief amongst us in this village who knew all our secrets and we did not even 
know that he was a bandit, but he knew all our actions and movements"28
The collusion of local youth with outside state officials against rural producers is 
disrupting the more usual moral economic relationships in agrarian Malagasy communities, 
whereby producer communities largely ‘stand together’ in the face of outside encroachment onto 
their land and resources (Gezon 1999, Osterhoudt 2016, Sodikoff 2012). The stakes of state 
corruption against farmers have also been raised; as the above quotes indicate, while state 
officials may not have given much protection to producers in the past, the current presumed 
complicity in vanilla theft crosses a moral and economic threshold for many farmers. 
26 Anon Aug 2017
27 Anon July 2017
28 Anon Sept 2018
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In face of these shifting social relationships, As such statements illustrate, vanilla farmers 
articulate the need for street justice to protect their livelihoods. against the lack of state control 
and the rising threat of insecurity, specifically in relation to their vanilla harvests. By mobilizing 
acts of mob violence, farmers seek to secure their vanilla harvests in a way that protects them 
from state retribution, and which maintains market relationships within local and regional 
systems of trade. Street justice events also work within certain existing Malagasy social and 
moral economic systems, that emphasize collective action and local autonomy. including 
framing confrontation through the collective rather than through the individual (Lambek and 
Solway 2001; Sodikoff 2012) and through expression of rural solidarity against outside forces 
that encroach upon local land and resources (Jeroz 1999, Osterhoudt 2016). Street violence also 
prevents punishment by the state, by diffusing responsibility across a large, essentially 
anonymous group (Goldstein 2003; Smith 2004).In such ways, as we discuss below, street justice 
acts fit within certain components of local moral economic systems.
As described in classic work on moral economy as connected to group resistance and 
violence, people perpetuating violence are not regarded as irrational or intrinsically violent 
individuals, but are rather acting within social and moral boundaries to secure basic rights and 
livelihoods within more informal spheres of solidarity (Metz et al. 2010). They are thus acting as 
essentially rational actors caught between powerful forces. Indeed, in Madagascar, farmers 
describe their position in these terms: people note that they do not enjoy having to resort to street 
justice tactics, but feel the economic stakes are too high to leave protection, or forms of 
retribution, to the mechanisms of the an absent or corrupt state.
 In targeting street justice, moreover, rural communities draw from Malagasy cultural forms of 
moral behavior, including framing confrontation through the collective rather than through the 
individual (Keenan 1974; Lambek and Solway 2001; Sodikoff 2012). Mob violence stresses the 
solidarity of the group in mobilizing collective punishment and protection, while also preventing 
effective state punishment by diffusing responsibility across a large, essentially anonymous 
group (Goldstein 2003; Smith 2004).
Media narratives of street justice 
 This unit of the collective as the locus of justice differs from western individualized 
notions of moral justice (Rawls 1971). One might expect that the local conceptions in rural 
Madagascar that farmers are performing regrettable, but understandable, acts of violence to 
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secure their rights to property and subsistence may differ from many of the media narratives of 
street justice in the vanilla market. In reality, the international media has been quite sympathetic 
to the plight of the Malagasy grower, positioning them as reacting to a market over which they 
have little control, and resort to a form ofturning to street justice as their last resort. However, for 
the most part, media reports at the same time have presented ‘market actors’ as not being at all 
complicit inof the current market crisis. Companies and civil society institutions are usually are 
cast as either victims of the breakdown of local market supply (just cannot get enough vanilla to 
fill your artisanal ice cream orders) and/or as ‘saviors’ who can circumvent the corrupt state 
officials and greedy middlemen to ‘clean up’ the supply chain. 
Figure 2: Photo from lead story of vanilla from the Financial Times story ‘The real Price of the 
vanilla boom:’ https://www.ft.com/content/02042190-65bc-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56
Thus, while sympathetic to small farmers’ actions, these media accounts also assume that the 
best course forward is to eliminate violent forms of street justice, changing these practices 
primarily by improving the state control over institutionalized forms of security, poverty 
reduction, and legal accountability. As quoted in a leading UK newspaper:
As vanilla becomes worth more than silver, crime takes over the Madagascan trade. It's 
not the backbreaking work that makes growing vanilla near impossible, it's the security 
problem. As it grows in value, 'vanilla murders' are becoming more common, but despite 
the hike in price, thousands of farmers still remain poor.29
And in French newspaper:
Dozens of thieves have been apprehended in recent weeks; and such is the anger some 
have ended up being brutally murdered. "People trust only the people's justice…”30
Other media accounts of the violence are quite sympathetic to peasants’ plight, however, even 
normalizing such acts in these areas:.
Farmers often awake to find their vines stripped bare, carried off in the night by gangs of 
thieves filling orders for buyers in the far-off capital of Antananarivo, who in turn supply 
29 Accessed at: https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/food-and-drink/features/vanilla-farming-crime-
madagascar-trade-a8520396.html (02/12/2018)
30 Accessed at: https://www.france24.com/en/20180420-magagascar-vanilla-price-trade-crime-crop-
weather  (06/06//2018)
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the markets of western Europe, the US and Asia. In some parts of Sava, say non-
governmental organisations working in the region, vigilante groups have sprung up to 
mete out summary justice to the vanilla snatchers.31
And another grower was depicted as describing moral equivalence in terms Western consumers 
could understand:
Soa [a vanilla grower] is plotting ever more dire punishments for anyone who does 
attempt to steal her current crop. At the moment vanilla thieves face 3-4 years in prison. 
As far as she is concerned, that’s not enough. She wants a life sentence. “You invest all 
your life in growing the vanilla. Stealing it is the same thing as killing someone.”32
Figure 3: Photo from Ft article of executives from Mars Inc. who have come to Madagascar 
on their first trip ever to plan development initiatives in order to stabilize farmers’ 
livelihoods and the market  
As the above headline illustrates, Evidence of international companies as are sometimes 
presented as ‘saviors’:
Emmanuel Faber, chairman and chief executive of Danone… recently travelled to 
Madagascar for the first time to find out why it is so expensive and what can be done to 
secure supplies and improve farmers’ lives.33
These headlines are both effective in reaching the global market, and provoke potentially strong 
reactions from ethical consumers. In the case of vanilla, for example, consumers drawn to Fair 
Trade labels to help smallholder farmers may balk at their purchase if they learn that these same 
farmers are involved in brutal mob killings – even if these mob events are motivated by the 
desire of farmers to safeguard their agrarian livelihoods.34 If anything, the ‘globalizing’ effect of 
these news stories moving them from the rural streets of vanilla growing villages to the 
31 Accessed at: https://www.ft.com/content/02042190-65bc-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56 (02/12/2018)
32Accessed at: http://time.com/5308143/vanilla-price-climate-change-madagascar/ (02/12/2018)
33 Accessed at: https://www.ft.com/content/02042190-65bc-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56 (02/12/2018)
34 It may be worth noting the role of the people identified with vanilla industry and market more 
generally. While smallholder vanilla farmers do not articulate resistance against market forces per se, the 
entrenched history of vanilla trade as imbricated in shady state practices becomes relevant. Many vanilla 
industry representatives remark that they must secure the loyalty of farmers in a supply-driven market, 
while also not falling out of favor with Malagasy government entities (who are empowered to revoke 
export licenses) or of international consumers, who may be upset by associations of violence with vanilla 
products. 
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supermarket shelves forces the ’visible hand’ of the state to have to intervene on the ‘invisible 
hand’ of the violent vanilla market both to ensure stability and to regain legitimacy under the 
banner of ‘law and order’. 
State legitimacy and militarizing a broken market 
Circulating media headlines on vanilla violence do not only potentially influence 
consumers – they are also forcing representatives in Madagascar’s government into action. After 
the increased international media attention on vanilla violence, the state knew it had to act, and 
fast quickly.35 In response to international criticism, the state, with donor and market support, 
selected some of the hardest hit hardest hit villages to ‘securitize vanilla landscapes,’ through 
militarized-style defense trainings and the surveillance of smallholders. Now with state support, 
A pilot project was conducted in six communes across alleach of the 4four districts of the region. 
The most well-known of these initiatives wais the village of Ambodivohitra Kobahina (Andapa 
Region) - also dubbed the "Zero Theft" village. In this village, specific farmers have formed 
village police meant to professionalize and ‘deputize ’what were formally ‘vigilante groups.’ 
This included the formation of farmers into paramilitary associations to secure their vanilla fields 
in six pilot communes in all 4 districts of the SAVA Region from 2015 onwards.36 The campaign 
included trainings of existing or newly established village vigilante groups with gendarmes in 
military-style defense and surveillance. tTrainings were given to smallholders on topics , 
including ed monitoring crops,  and securing paths leading to and from the fields, camouflaging,, 
how to placeplacinging suspects caught under arrest, and how to handle suspects transportinging 
suspected and thieves how to follow through to make sure official justice is followed to official 
throughpolice stations the courts.37  Alongside new village security groups, known by villagers 
as “police fokonolo” (the villager’s police), the state have installed barricades in areasat village 
35Beyond vanilla theft, the media was also now investigating rumoursrumors that ‘new vanilla buyers’ 
were laundering money from illegally trafficked rosewood. Accessed on: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/mar/31/madagascars-vanilla-wars-prized-spice-drives-
death-and-deforestation (02/12/2018).
36 GIZ actually published these rules in March 2017 and they are being distributed since in about 86 
communes and 829 villages considered to be core vanilla producing areas. "Dinam-Paritra Momba Ny 
Seha-Pihariana Lavanio Faritra SAVA.  It touched all 4 districts of the SAVA region. The project 
officially ended in February 2017.
37 Interview with SAVA/Development Coordination Unit (DCU) 11/20/2018.
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ancesentrancesing and leaving the villagesexits, as well asnd curfews.38 There have also been 
Farmers have alsoevivdethe traditionaltheirwith
Yet, R-Farmers forming paramilitary associations have already existed in a handful of 
villages when the project started in 2015. The most well-known of thesem is the village of 
Ambodivohitra Kobahina (Andapa Region) - also dubbed the "Zero Theft" village. But not in all 
villages across the SAVA, which took these trainings, growers established village-based security 
associations that go beyond the village patrols (vigilante) groups erecting checkpoints 
(barricades) at the village entry. for security trainings based on the This is only happening where 
there is a lot of quantity of vanilla produced, where whether the community of vanilla farmers 
group in solidarity to defend their economic assets.39 The sSecurity associations established 
through these projects consisted of armed men from the village who patrolled the fields day and 
night (especially. at night) during the dangerous months of (February through- August.). While 
some members dutifully handed over the bandits they apprehended to the police, others 
dcideddecided to forego these official channels and pursue street justice measures. In these cases, 
people typically beat thievesthe thefts, in order to deter others from stealing thievesThey put up 
traps, and hand over thieves that they have caught to the police. Yet, rather than using official 
channels, sSome of them also decided on direct justice measures (typically beating up of thieves) 
- such as the one from Ambodivohitra Kobahina - to set an example to deter further theft. 40 This 
continuation of violence has not necessarily instilled the confidence in the state to handle these 
matters, as stories of vicious acts in rural communities of violence and reprises continued to 
circulate well after the scheme ended in 2016. An extreme example of such a story includes is 
the account of anthe extra-judicial killing of a child in the Antalaha Region, who was murdered 
by a bandit during an act of vanilla theft. [[and reflects the pressure the stateA now feels to act on 
vanilla violence: ‘There was a child who guarded a vanilla field whom the thieves have cut into 
pieces. It looked as if they had cut off the feet of a slaughtered cow. The thieves were caught and 
are at prison right now.’]]Overall, 
the projects of militarization and ‘zero theft’ villages represent Stories of such 
extreme violence are less rare, nonetheless, These new village security groups, who received 
38 Interview HoS/AK 02/12/2018 and DCU11/20/2018.
39 Interview DCU 11/20/2018.
40 Interview Head of Security in Ambodivohitra Kobahina (HoS/AK) 02/12/2018.
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paramilitary training, have installed barricades in areas entering and leaving the villages, and 
village curfews. They are known by villagers as “police fokonolo” (the villager’s police).41 There 
have also been a renewal of a very longstanding technique of stamping (scarring) each vanilla 
pod with an individual ‘ID code’ which is registered in the village commune. While this was 
once a widespread practice, for years it fell out of favour due to the increased labour time it took. 
The state, donor organisations and market actors, all have in their own ways both appropriated 
some of these village level techniques at security and created their own measures in other 
villages throughout the region. Yet by far the most elaborate attempts by the state to restore a 
‘civilized commodity production landscape’ most palatable to their global consumers. 
International development groups have also gotten involved in through ‘law and order’ 
vanilla initiatives has been to rof that kind has been the rampping up of securitization through 
and creating ‘locallocalized ‘codes of conduct’. which are meant to provide a more recognizable, 
albeit more militarized and in some cases quite draconian measures that are meant to resemble 
‘law and order’ which both the state and market find most palatable to their global consumers.
For example, in 2017, the German Development Agency, GIZ, and the Regional SAVA 
government, in 2017, draftedcreated a new village ‘Ddina Be,’ or the re-writing of ‘local codes 
of conduct,’ which are meant to be written written in-sync in-line with existing national laws and 
regulations and be applied across multiple villages in the region in matters pertaining to vanilla 
(GIZ 2017). This approach seems to resonate for the most part, seems more ‘normalizing’ with 
manytoas Malagasy village leaders, including mayors andor pastors, who commonly advocate 
against public justice, encouraging their constituents to pursue justice through state-sanctioned 
means. The individuals who participate in street justice violence themselves often acknowledge 
that such mob acts are not ideal mechanisms to stop thefts, but they state that without effective 
state protection, farmers are left with no other choice to protect their livelihoods, members of 
vigilante groups are seldom punished by state authorities, although regional and national 
governments have issued proclamations strongly encouraging farmers to turn in suspected 
vanilla thieves to the police instead of pursuing street justice measures.42
While there were varying degrees of success of these village security sites, in terms of 
vigilante group cohesion and organization, around the clock surveillance and even aspects of 
41 Interview HoS/AK 02/12/2018 and DCU11/20/2018.
42 Interview HoS/AK 02/12/2018.
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self-financing, it represents an attempt of the state to re-gain control and retain some appearance 
of control over rural areas. Yet the state is not alone in this effort. At the National level, Iindustry 
groups compriseding of vanilla firms private sector actors43 have also lent their support to 
campaigns against vanilla theft and street justice, launching aggressive anti-theft campaigns, 
,such as the  ‘Un Billet sans Retour pour Les Voleurs de la Campagne’ [‘One-way Ticket for 
Thieves’] and a second lobbying effort to important initiative to ‘Bban public verdicts’ (vindicte 
populaire or Vvigilante Jjustice)’ Ooutright’.44 International trading companies are motivated in 
part through their understanding of the intricate links between being able to secure enough high-
quality vanilla and maintaining their long-standing relationships with growers. They too have 
also stepped up supported security efforts at the of local and national levels, by giving security 
related material to farmers (e.g., raincoats, torches, first aid kits, and blankets) and . Additionally, 
due to demands from the smallholders, some large vanilla trading companies have begun to pay 
up to US$500 paying toto transport the thieves to Antananarivo to stand trial – away from 
regional networks which are seen as more corrupt. Farmers, with support of firms, have also 
revived the traditional labor-intensive technique of stamping (scarring) each vanilla pod with 
their individual ‘ID code’ registered with the village commune.The logic here is that the thieves 
caught have no social network in the capital and will not be released by the gendarmerie so 
quickly. Finally, on the consumer level, they must secure their product quality and reputation. 
Albeit sympathetic to the plight of the Malagasy smallholder, they also understand that their own 
businesses are on the line with the continual increase of early harvested vanilla, the reputation of 
the once prized Malagasy bourbon vanilla bean is in danger of being tarnished beyond repair. 
Thus, many in the industry express concern with the security situation of smallholder farmers 
most directly in relation to the decrease in vanilla bean quality.
In sum, regional and national Malagasy authorities condemning mob killings , implore 
rural residents to adopt strategies of ‘law and order’ sanctioned by the state. Government 
initiatives ‘militarize’ vanilla farmers through state-led trainings with public-private 
contributions. International aid organizations and private vanilla businesses often support these 
43 ‘Groupement des exportateurs et acheteurs de vanille’ (GPAS) and the ‘Association des Collecteurs de 
Vanille’ (ASCOVA). 
44 Interview DCU11/20/2018. This included a large workshop on ‘sensitization on the popular verdict’ 
held in Sambava, financed by the UNDP, and organized by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Public 
Security, the Secretary of State of National Gendaremerie, and the Ministry of Public Security and the 
Interior and Decentralization.
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efforts. For the regional and national Malagasy government, violence does not denote self-
correcting moral economic relationships but rather a breakdown in the ability to maintain a 
civilized moral order in the margins, thereby indicating thea need for the state toto take back 
control over violence in rural areas.  
5. Discussion: Bringing together Discussion: street justice, mMoral hyper-proximity and 
commodity tradethe civilized commodity
With vanilla prices at historic highs, and incidences of vanilla theft from fields 
widespread, pPeasant smallholders in Madagascar are experiencing a moral economic 
repositioning between the state and market. Yet overall, despite differences in gender, wealth, 
and ethnicity, find a broader solidarity emerging in the vanilla crisis. Rather than providing 
protection, state police are suspected of observed exploiting farmers through collusion with 
thieves. The vanilla market, deregulated since the 1990s, also does not offer support to farmers, 
and instead encourages people to find illegal means to profit from the lucrative boom. and theft 
as a way to regain their footing in the lucrative vanilla market lost since deregulation. Farmers 
resist state and market power in part by taking ‘matters into their own hands’ through acts of 
street justice. Yet overallThus, despite differences in gender, wealth, and ethnicity, many 
smallholder producers are finding a broader solidarity emerging in the vanilla crisis. This 
solidarity draws from moral economies that emphasize collective action and local autonomy in 
order to protect land and resources from outside encroachment. 
As we note, the actions of smallholder farmers in this context present conceptual and 
empirical links with the existing literature on However, as we show, in a period of sped up 
consumer producer relations, the state and market react to such high-profile peasant violence 
with ‘civilized’ law and order style responses meant to discipline the behavior of farmers and to 
demonstrate state legitimacy and maintain the state monopoly of violence in rural landscapes.  
The conceptual and empirical links we make in this paper to moral economy and concerns around 
subsistence ethics traditionally found within critical agrarian studies (Thompson 1971; Scott 1976; 
Edelman 2005; Wolford 2010). This work has have been instructive for a variety of scholars 
understanding uneven development between rural peasant livelihoods and state and markets. However, 
Albeit Despite , such as experienced in the current boom market.our work surrounding on the rural moral 
economiesy of village ‘street justice’, we argue, also connects more broadly with scholarship 
characterizing violence in urban ‘street’ settings (Pavoni and Tulumello 2018; Karandinos et al. 2014; 
Commented [NB1]:  Can also go here or below
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Anderson’s 1999; Bourgois 2003), and in particular,especially the localized forms of justice materializing 
in the absence of institutional and official forms of adjudication (Spierenburg 2009). We feel this 
rConsideringe-positioning of moral economic change through athe lens of diverse forms of street justice 
can help build a conceptual bridge between rural and urban moral economies, especially during periods of 
under economic and social crisis. and similar dynamics concerning violence and commodity production. 
This work also expands the analysis of rural moral economies to extend farther across the 
commodity chain, and highlights the iterative relationships between producers and consumers. 
Such interactions in part stem from the changing realities of global commodity relationships and 
new media platforms, whereby consumers have – or believe that they have–  access to a greater 
quantity of accurate information about conditions of production (West 2012). With the 
proliferation of social media market narratives, block chain technologies, and certifications, 
Northern consumers feel ever closer to the people producing their products (Goodman 2004; 
Moberg 2014). As we demonstrate, Madagascar vanilla provides a case where potential 
consumers may encounter both positive and negative narratives about production. It is this very 
tension that worries industry experts. While our study does not focus on the behavior or 
decisions of consumers of vanilla, we do examine how downstr am market actors in the 
intersecting moral economies of Madagascar’s vanilla boom imagine the possible reactions of 
distant consumers, especially if vanilla becomes known as a ‘blood’ commodity. Indeed, one 
Madagascar vanilla industry expert worried that the widespread condemnation of the incidence 
of violence surrounding the vanilla boom would cause “Madagascar vanilla [to] be the next 
‘blood diamond’ example” for consumers, leading to vanilla boycotts.45 
 Government officials and private companies react to escalating rural street violence, and 
the possible market fallout, by imposing stricter discipline on people and agrarian landscapes, 
including surveillance. and boom and bust. One takeaway here is that differences in moral 
sensibilities tend to coalesce against the market and state Malagasy seem to find ways to 
navigate changes in moral economy. Since deregulation of the vanilla market, the state, normally 
the arbitrator of injustices has been absent and therefore not 
TheseAs commodity businesses and Madagascar’s government react to the escalation of 
smallholder street justice, they are also responding to how they believe consumers of 
45 Anon Aug.2018
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Madagascar vanilla may respond if vanilla becomes known as a ‘blood’ commodity. Indeed, one 
Madagascar vanilla industry expert worried that the widespread condemnation of the incidence 
of violence surrounding the vanilla boom would cause “Madagascar vanilla [to] be the next 
‘blood diamond’ example” for consumers, leading to vanilla boycotts.46  ‘civilized’ law and 
order style responses are meant to discipline the behavior of farmers, and to maintain the state 
monopoly of violence in rural landscapes. Their concerns in part stem from the changing realities 
of global commodity relationships and new media platforms, whereby consumers have – or 
believe that they have–   - access to a greater quantity of accurate information about conditions 
of production (West 2012).  and as we demonstrate 
We refer to these conditions as moral hyper-proximity. Moral hyper-proximity 
compresses not only the economic spaces of trade – eliminating certain nodes of middlemen 
exchange between producer and consumer (Harvey 2002) – but also ideological spaces (Tsing 
2015; Anderson 2014; Bair and Werner 2014). Through social media and other outlets, 
consumers can quickly learn about forms of production connected with the products, and to 
imagine themselves as imbricated in the lives of producers (West 2012). Many times, these 
messages emphasize positive effects of trade, such as the community benefits of Fair Trade or 
the environmental benefits of organic certification. However, in the cases the messaging can be 
disturbing, detailing the exploitation and harm brought by existing systems with more powerful 
entities subjecting people, and environments, to forms of violence (c.f. Le Billon 2000). Making 
visible the harmful aspects of commodities can lead to successful organization of consumer 
activism that exerts public and financial pressure on corporations to improve labour conditions 
for smallholder farmers, or factory workers (Bair and Werner 2014). 
Madagascar vanilla provides a case where potential consumers may encounter both 
positive and negative narratives about production. As prompted by many marketing campaigns, 
vanilla consumers are only just a few quick links away on their smartphone to hear of the 
marvels of the vanilla orchid, Fair Trade projects that build village schools, or the generations of 
farmers benefiting from trade initiatives.47 A bit more digging on Madagascar vanilla, however, 
and what comes into focus may be much less appetizing, as one encounters the many 
international media accounts describing the Malagasy vanilla economy in crisis – a crisis that 
46 Anon Aug.2018
47 examples
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includes farmers killing suspected thieves through mob violence. In this way, the ‘ugly’ stories 
of trade that consumers encounter through media and marketing narratives does not cast the 
usual players as representing negative forces of trade, such as multinational conglomerates or 
greedy middlemen. Instead, it is often the peasant farmer – and not the powerful institutions of 
global capitalism - using violence against others in order to protect their fields and resources. 
The result is that engaged consumers eager to ‘vote with their dollar’ may face conflicting 
messages if consumers learn that the smallholder farmers who they feel in solidarity with are acting in 
unexpected ways - for example, not as empathetic resistors of state power, but rather as themselves 
engaging in violent acts. Tthe very tension that worries industry experts. While our study does not focus 
on the behavior or decisions of consumers of vanilla, we do examine how downstream market actors 
others in the intersecting moral economies of Madagascar’s vanilla boom imagine the possible reactions 
of distant consumers. IIn such imaginations, and responses by businesses, media, and governments, we 
see a common ground of firms attempting to fashion the ‘unruly,’ ‘violent vanilla bean’ into a more 
‘civilized commodity.This process models for farmers the ‘correct’ way to act in a global commodity 
marketplace, according to the beliefs of private businesses, governments, and consumers as to what falls 
within, and outside of, moral limits of behaviors. 48 Overall, governments and markets aim to fashion the 
‘unruly’ and ‘violent’ vanilla bean into a more ‘civilized commodity.’.
The stakes of defining what a civilized commodity looks like – how they are produced, 
circulated, consumed and governed – are high. This is demonstatelyclearly true for smallholder 
farmers who engage in acts of life and death against thieves, but also and for consumers, as well 
who are increasingly urged to ‘vote with their dollar.’. Thus, just as Elias noted that projects of 
societal rule consistently shift what is considered 'correct' behaviors for civilizing individuals, so 
too are there shifting expectations for the 'behavior' of commodities that circulate in global 
markets - as well as for the consumers of these commodities. Such debates intersect with the 
cultural norms of what people believe to be appropriate individual and societal behaviors. In the 
mid-20 Century, Elias (1939: Vol .1, 1969; Vol 2, 1982) detailed changes in social behavior and 
psychology in the social structures of European societies over the longue durée between the 
European Middle Ages and 18th Century. Elias exhibited how societal expectations of 
‘appropriate behavior’ or how ‘one should act’ has changed over time. This surrounded 
48 the increased use of certification schemes in specialty commodity chains have developed standards by 
which normative behaviors, such as strict working conditions, child labour, quality control, environmental 
and organic standards have been applied to peasant farmers by a northern consumer base (Besky 2013). 
48
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everything from table manners, bodily functions, nose blowing and spitting, sleeping, to sexual 
relations and aggression. 
Elias makes a point in signaling periods of economic transformation and specialization in 
the late 18th Century (Durkheim 1893); when labour shifts brought social classes (e.g., the 
‘village’ cobbler and the Bourgeois merchant), normally kept apart, in more frequent contact. 
This new contact between ‘unlike social classes’ altered how people acted when in closer 
proximity, and thus, instilled a ‘civilizing processes’ of learned behaviors, such as the capacity of 
foresight, rationalization and self-restraint; and the internalization of negative emotions (e.g. 
anxiety, disgust), originating from courtly societies and upper classes downward onto the general 
population. These behaviors were over time subsequently reified through social sanction and 
other disciplining tools by the state (Foucault 1998; Weber 1993). For instance, in his later work, 
Elias (1982) thought of the civilizing process as essential to building of the nation-state with 
newly formed governments both reinforcing ‘appropriate behaviors’ to reinforce state legitimacy 
and enforce tax collection, and most noteworthy, maintaining a monopoly on violence. 
Although Elias details the social psychological changes of societies over time, Foucault’s 
use of ‘bio-power’ describes how disciplinary forms of power and knowledge have come to 
‘normatively prescribe how both individuals and populations should behave’ (Cavanagh 2018, 
405) and to exercise sovereignty in order to have the power to ‘define life’ itself. As Mambe and 
Meintjes (2003, 12) note, ‘…to exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to 
define life as the deployment and manifestation of power’. Similar to Elias’ later work on the 
nation-state, Foucault (1991) draws on the sovereign state and its populations in the post-
Enlightenment period and the emergence of scientific measurement and regulation as 
instruments to foster progress in health and living conditions. These new instruments of 
disciplinary power emerge as a way to legitimize the state control over individuals and of broad 
swaths of the population more generally (Cavanagh 2018). 
This disciplinary power gains particular relevance when looking at peasant populations 
and their current and emerging conditions in disciplinary global relationships of commodity 
production.49 As illustrated with the vanilla boom and street justice, various constituencies – 
49 the increased use of certification schemes in specialty commodity chains have developed standards by 
which normative behaviors, such as strict working conditions, child labour, quality control, environmental 
and organic standards have been applied to peasant farmers by a northern consumer base (Besky 2013). 
49
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farmers, traders, businesses, governments, consumers – fashion an idea of what is within and 
outside of moral limits of their behaviors. This differing moral economies are not produced and 
enacted in isolation, but interact and influence one another. 
Beyond Elias’ analysis of ‘civilizing projects’ as discussed above, Foucault’s use of ‘bio-
power’ is instructive hereof how disciplinary tools of power and knowledge normatively 
prescribe behavior and to exercise sovereignty over ‘life itself’ (Cavanagh 2018, 405). As 
Mambe and Meintjes (2003, 12) note, ‘…to exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over 
mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power’. These instruments of 
disciplinary power emerge as a way to legitimize the state, and now the market, control over 
individuals and of broad swaths of thepopulations. population more generally.
The stakes of defining what a ‘just’ commodity looks like – how they are produced, circulated, 
consumed and governed – are high. This is demonstately true for smallholder farmers who engage in acts 
of life and death against thieves. For consumers, as well, stakes of civilizing commodity relationships also 
appear high. For example, at a coffee shop in Indiana, where one of the co-authors lives and works, there 
is a display of Madagascar vanilla granola bars, each which declares in large block letters, "THIS BAR 
SAVES LIVES!" Such marketing narratives reflect the increasing moral stakes of consumption: where 
the choice of one's granola bar carries life-and-death implications.
Finally, both of the previous research themes contribute to the broader project to produce, 
circulate, and regulate the civilized commodity. Just as Elias noted that projects of societal rule 
consistently shift what is considered 'correct' behaviors for civilizing individuals, so too are there shifting 
expectations for the 'behavior' of commodities that circulate in global markets - as well as for the 
consumers of these commodities. With hyper-proximity and emerging forms of onto-power embedded in 
new commodity relationships, there is also more opportunity for different people situated across 
commodity chains to comment on one another's behavior, which is often framed in moralizing terms of 
fairness and justice (Moberg and Lyon 2010). Yet, this process of commodity 'civilization' largely 
overlooks the unruly spaces of materiality and, sociality , and exchange that mark trade of all sorts, many 
of which draw from alternative forms of power and cultural relationships (Dove 2011).  In circulating 
narrow discourses of how 'civilized' commodities should behave, these alternate ecologies, economies, 
and epistemologies can be lost, as well as the particular forms of power and meaning that connect with 
them (Li 2014). Further, fashioning a 'civilized commodity' can result in a situation where a commodity 
system outwardly seems to conform with Northern, individualistic notions of justice and morality, while 
obscuring other tdifferent types of systematic, structural, and economic violence and injustice faced by 
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smallholder farmers, such as policies of targeted violence, empowerment of elite classes, de-regulation of 
market safeguards, and environmental pollution (Brown 2013; Alvarez and Coolsaet 2019). 
Critically examining the circulating mMoral discourses centered on how commodities (and 
farmers) ‘should’ behave can help inform work to create more equitable arrangements for global markets. 
intertwine with state, market governance, and labour relationships (Moberg 2014). Each of these entities 
are positioned differently in their ability to define and controlling the "just" circulation of commodity 
trade. By locating the moral nexus of the smallholder, state, and the market, individuals concerned with 
creating more equitable arrangements for global markets can better locate sites of resistance, especially in 
our current periodds whenre the rise of rural populism seems to also be coincideing with new forms of 
authoritarianism (Bosworth 2018; Mouffe 2018; Scoones et al., 2018). Indeed, much of the work of 
contemporary peasant activists consists of trying to name and put in the spotlight the institutional agency 
- and responsibilities - behind the increasingly hard to place state and market entities (Edelman 2005, 332; 
Scott 1976).The fraught relations of the vanilla commodity boom – and the forms of violence it engenders 
–demonstrates collision of market forces, state politics, and agrarian production within increasingly 
volatile - and compressed - relationships of global commodity chains.
Who and what is being civilized across what scale and to what ends? What happens when these 
‘projects’ contradict one another? What ecological and cultural systems are lost or undermined within 
projects to create a single form of 'civilized' commodity?
68. Conclusion
Recent discussions in critical agrarian studies have begun to coalesce around how to incorporate 
multiplicity of justice conceptions emanating from the global south (Álvarez and Coolsaet 2019) 
and shortcomings that account spatial and historical complexity or recognition (J. Fraser 2018). 
There are many questions surrounding justice and commodities and trade, however, and is 
particularly acute since the global commodities spans multiple forms of justice which include 
different scales and spaces and across cultural, social, political and environmental contexts. What 
understandings of justice does global trade of commodities bring as it moves along the chain – 
particularly around changing smallholder’s commodity relationships? 
As we demonstrate, at times of global commodity crisis, peasants are under acute periods 
of stress and seek out their own brand of moral and environmental justice, sometimes leading to 
what downstream actors and the state observe as ‘un-civilized’ forms mob violence and other 
tools of resistance to both state power and market exploitation.  While our discussion highlights 
vanilla, A similar weight is given to any number of commodities today, which carry with them 
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disturbing accounts of forced child labor (Nkamleu and Kielland 2006), environmental 
destruction (Koh and Wilcove 2008), and organized acts of violence (Frazier 2018). 
While it is an overall positive and productive development that Northern consumers are 
recognizing how their products trace back to the lives of real producers (Raynolds 2000), there 
remains glaring disconnects between how consumers imagine these far-off producers' lives, and 
how the producers themselves experience them (Brown 2013; Moberg 2014; West 2012). In the 
case of Madagascar vanilla, while consumers of a Fair Trade granola bar may picture their 
purchase 'saving lives' by helping to build a village hospital, vanilla farmers articulate that the 
largest immediate threat to maintaining their livelihoods is escalating theft, and the acute 
atmosphere of fear and violence that it brings to everyday life. 
Moral discourses centered around how commodities (and farmers) ‘should’ behave 
intertwine with state, market governance, and labour relationships (Moberg 2014). Each of these 
entities are positioned differently in their ability to define and controlling the "just" circulation of 
commodity trade. By locating the nexus of the smallholder, state and the market, individuals 
concerned with creating more equitable arrangements for global markets can better locate sites of 
resistance, especially in our current periods where the rise of rural populism seems to also be 
coinciding with new forms of authoritarianism (Bosworth 2018; Mouffe 2018; Scoones et al., 
2018). Indeed, much of the work of contemporary peasant activists consists of trying to name 
and put in the spotlight the institutional agency - and responsibilities - behind the increasingly 
hard to place state and market entities (Edelman 2005, 332; Scott 1976).The fraught relations of 
the vanilla commodity boom – and the forms of violence it engenders – proves an instructive 
case to analyze the collision of market forces, state politics, agrarian production, and ethical 
consumption within increasingly volatile - and compressed - relationships of global commodity 
supply chains. 
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